The Muslim Brotherhood’s International links: More hindrance than help

Posted on September 29, 2013 by nervana111

Three months after June30, the Brotherhood leaders are either in prison, hiding, or in exile. Following the massive crackdown, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has decided to move its media center to an undisclosed address in London. This announcement has coincided with news of alleged meetings held by the Muslim Brotherhood’s international organization in Istanbul and Lahore to look at ways to escalate action against the regime in Egypt. There is also an Islamist gathering in Doha chaired by Qatari-based Azmi Bishara to discuss the Islamist movement and democracy.

The Muslim brotherhood has experienced two major waves that have risen and fallen. The first wave was in 1928 in its original launch by group founder Hassan el-Banna and then the ruthless crackdown of president Nasser beginning in 1954. The second wave started in 1971 with the release of their leaders from imprisonment, and ended this year with the collapse of Morsi’s rule and the subsequent crackdown.

The collective movements along the axis of Doha – Istanbul – London -Lahore can provide refuge to the Brotherhood diaspora and another chance to regroup and launch a third wave. Many analysts have already written passionately that the group is down, but not finished as an organization. They argue that ideas do not die, particularly, as in the Brotherhood case, where the ideas are fortified by deeply rooted social structures, including medical charities and extensive student networks.

While this is true, the question still remains if the outside mushrooming of the Brotherhood will help or hinder the group’s activities within Egypt. There is the potential for negative impacts from this new flux of outside support. A successful rise of a third wave is challenged by several factors.

The loss of support from most Gulf states

Unlike the time during the 70s, the current Brotherhood has lost important backers in the Gulf region like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Their members and supporters in these countries will have to tread carefully in order to prevent a similar crackdown. Saudi Arabia’s support of the current leadership in Egypt and its hostile stance against the Muslim Brotherhood is well known. In the UAE, the battle against the Muslim Brotherhood continues along with the imprisonment of 69 Islamists for sedition. Undoubtedly, Qatar will try its best to fill the void, but despite its endless financial resources; history and geography is against this tiny, rich Arab state. Qatar has simply never won when its neighbors actively stood up against its interests. Therefore, a revival of 70s survival tactics in the Gulf would be a  hard and tricky task for the Muslim Brotherhood and its patron Qatar.

The elusive support of the Ottomans

Turkey is another emerging patron of the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has repeatedly rejected the ousting of Morsi, and openly criticized the army leader Sisi, even hinting that one-day Sisi may be assassinated. The manufactured yellow and black Rabaa hand gesture was invented in Turkey and exported to Egypt. Istanbul is a haven for many Brotherhood cadres. There is a mutual romantic vision shared by the Muslim Brotherhood and the neo-Ottomans; both consider the collapse of the Ottoman empire as the root of the many problems and challenges that have plagued Middle Eastern societies. This is misplaced romanticism for many reasons

  • The new Ottomans view the region from the prism of their collapsed empire, but they lack knowledge and expertise in modern Arab history that can help them to engage positively with regional players in the post-Arab-spring era. This is precisely why they failed to grasp the reasons behind the rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
  • The new Ottomans are heavily focusing on fighting the coup in Egypt, rather than helping the Brotherhood to emulate their own Turkish transformation after the 1997 coup in Turkey. Ottoman anger is feeding the Brotherhood’s emotional jittery behavior, rather than helping to spur a more sober recovery and transformation of the group’s 85-year-old senile structure.
  • Ottoman Islamists have no clear theory regarding the role of religion in political life. Their own experience is mainly a slow introduction of religious teaching and symbols to replace the kemalist doctrine. They have not developed a clear strategy to buttress against Islamic radicalism, or to strengthen liberalizing Islamic thoughts. Therefore, their role in modernizing the Muslim brotherhood will always be limited to the tactical and not the ideological front.

The UK

As Bel Trew has explained, London is an important destination outside of Egypt for the Brotherhood. There are already various Brotherhood activists who live in London that have developed close links with traditional UK media outlets, and they are heavily involved in lobbying for the Muslim Brotherhood cause. Hesham Shafick aptly explained why did the Muslim Brotherhood survive in London. But again, links with the UK have limitations:

  • Although London was the head office for the Brotherhood’s English-language website, “Ikhwanweb,” since 2005, currently, however, the web site is under more scrutiny and exposure, any press release is meticulously checked by opponents. Moving to London may maintain the group’s freedom, but it will not give the movement any breathing space to expand upon clichés or doublespeak.
  • London is also a base for other non-Islamists Egyptian expats, and of many Gulf-sponsored outlets that are openly against the Muslim Brotherhood.
  • As Shafick explained, moving to London will leave Cairo with the less skilled elite.
  • All the cadres who move to the UK will be exposed to financial and legal scrutiny, as the British government has recently tighten the laws regarding permanent residency, financial links, and tax declaration. Unlike the 80s and 90s, Islamists cadres may not find London to be the same friendly place it once was to them.

Pakistan

The choice of Lahore for a Brotherhood meeting may came as surprise to some, but the link between the Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistan is as old as the group itself; this historic photo is just one example. Following June30, many Pakistanis have protested against the coup, and in support of the Brotherhood. They drew similarities between events in Egypt with their own 1999 coup by General Musharraf. Can Pakistan help Egypt’s Brotherhood? The short answer is an emphatic no. Other than moral support, and some protests holding the Rabaa sign, Pakistan has no political or financial impact in Egypt that qualify it to offer fundamental support to their Egyptian Brothers. It also values its relation with Saudi Arabia and may not wish to compromise that relationship.

While countries like Turkey and Pakistan may want to help the Muslim Brotherhood, they also need to focus on their own domestic front. Such a clash in interests may affect the long-term strategic alliance between the Brotherhood and these countries.

To sum up, the new Doha – Istanbul – London – Lahore axis may provide the Muslim Brotherhood with moral, residential and financial support, but it will not help the group to re-boot or launch its third wave of incarnation inside Egypt. The organization may find a surge of non-Egyptian supporters, but this will only be associated with a decline or no change in Egyptian affiliations. Ideas do not die, but its survival may depend on various mutations. The Brotherhood in its third wave may inherit many English, Turkish, and Urdu traits, but at root they have to solve the conundrum of how to channel these new traits into a strategy to save and reinvigorate their social and political roots inside Egypt in a post-Morsi era.

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt, June30 | Tagged , , , , , , | 14 Comments

Egyptian Aak. Week 39

Posted on September 29, 2013 by nervana111

Main Headlines

 Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday

Thursday

Friday

Saturday

Sunday

Good Report

Good Read  

Finally here are Jayson Casper’s prayers for Egypt

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt | Tagged , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

A Different Approach to Egypt’s future.

Posted on September 23, 2013 by nervana111

The sense among many activists and observers of Egypt is resignation and pessimism. Many fear that Egypt is on the wrong track, heading away from democracy, and back to an era of autocracy and a police state. This feeling is understandable, but it is not helpful. The key to the salvation of Egypt is not to lose faith, but to accept that progress will take time, tenacious effort, and patience in order to fulfill democratic aspirations. The current mood, with its negative emotion, is neither productive nor healthy. We cannot allow ourselves to drift away and lose focus.

Currently, Egyptians are divided into two camps: some are rightly watching the army as hawks, citing the many violations of human rights and press freedom, while others are focused on the Muslim Brotherhood, their allies and their perceived bad policies. Both camps, however, are not doing Egypt any good.

There are several steps that can help in shaking out the current politics of emotion and replacing it instead with some rational mature discourse.

 First, understand the micro-elements of June30

 The best explanation I have heard so far was from Egyptian diplomat Ashraf Swelam. In his view, June30 was a revolution, counter-revolution, and state-revolution all at the same time. The three elements without doubt existed. Unfortunately, the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as many western analysts, lump it all together and label the elements collectively as the “deep state.”

 A) The counter-revolution or Mubarak’s felool are still around, and many of them are still influential within the various pillars of the state, but they are not the predominant part of the equation. In fact, they may end-up as the big losers, especially with their possible ban from running in elections.

 B) There are other public servants who rejected Morsi simply because they were against his ineffective governance and bias towards those loyal to him. It is fair to say that on June30, the state pillar revolted against its head (Morsi).

 C) The wider Egyptian public who joined in June30 was not tricked or ill advised. They also had legitimate grievances and felt that the street, and not the ballot box, was the proper source of legitimacy in an infantile democracy. As for the army, it provided the umbrella for all of the three elements to unite.

 Second, the Muslim Brotherhood

 It may be difficult to believe, but there are many non-Islamists who want to have an inclusive democracy that includes the Muslim Brotherhood. However, it is crucial for the Brotherhood to help itself before others can help. There are several self-inflicted mistakes that the Brotherhood insists on committing despite continued counter-productive outcomes:

Alliance with radicals

Despite vehement denial that the group has any links with radical Jihadis, the Brotherhood continues to release statements painting Dalga, Kerdasa, and other militant strongholds as “anti-coup,” ignoring that militants have entered these towns and terrorize some the citizens, particularly Christians. As long as there are pockets of lawlessness and violent resistance, the army will continue to play the security card to justify ruthless crackdowns. Assem Abdel Magid and his group are a fringe group that the Brotherhood should disown and not defend.

Doublespeak

Here is one example cited by Mina Fayek. The Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice party’s Arabic website denies that Copts have faced violence and also accused them of spreading false news. Conversely, an English statement was released from the Muslim Brotherhood’s London office condemning the attacks on Dalga’s Copts, expressing “solidarity” with their “Christian brothers and sisters.” Doublespeak harms the Muslim Brotherhood cause and deepens the mistrust of them among the wider public.

Past mistakes

 There is a school of thought among the Brotherhood that considers that now is not the time for reflection, but rather it is the time to fight to be a political survivor. This is wrong. Reflecting on the past is actually part of the fight, because again, it strips the military of excuses not to include the Brotherhood in Egypt’s political future.

Third, accept that there is no quick fix to the current crisis

Like their rush to rule the country after the January 2011 revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood and their anti-coup allies continue to maintain the formal goal of “reversing the coup.” The problem is that the Egyptian military is not a rotten tooth that can be easily extracted; it is a deeply rooted pillar of the Egyptian state. Besides their economic and political influence, the army is considered a melting pot that provides soldiers with a uniting bond that no other institution in Egypt provides.

Any “eradication” process as Amr Darrag and other Islamists talk about will potentially set the country on a fast track to a failed state, simply because there is no detailed reform replacement program that will be capable of governing the day after. In fact, the lack of a realistic, solid reform project was a key reason why the Muslim Brotherhood failed in the first place. The Brotherhood’s ongoing protests may salvage the group as I have written last week, but will not salvage Egypt, as they just want to send the army back to their barracks, but they have yet to produce their own roadmap for the future.

Nonetheless, the rise of fortune for general Sisi and the wave of nationalism that followed is not good news for Egypt. Dictatorship generally goes through three phases. First, there is an early control phase, followed by an uncertain phase, which is mainly a time to test the waters and “clear” enemies, and then the last phase that establishes a permanent autocratic regime. Egypt is currently in the second phase and there are many balloons being floated to gauge the public mood.  As I have written before, Egypt has always needed to consent to autocracy; therefore, the military elite will not feel comfortable ruling without good public support.

Arguably, the military today enjoys considerable “love” and support, however, this will not necessarily be permanent. It is our responsibility to keep the current leadership in Egypt on its toes, and prevent them from having an easy time or enjoying a drift into autocracy. The trick is to do this without undermining the functionality of the state.

It is time for both Islamists and “true” liberals in Egypt to downgrade their rather ambitious goal of “reversing the coup” to a more achievable goal of taming the military and minimizing its impact on political life. This can start with small goals, like campaigning against military privileges in the constitution, and banning ex-military from running in the presidential election, and more importantly field an alternate candidate for presidential election. It will not be easy as the pro-military are loud and influential, but it is not impossible. By focusing on small goals, Egyptians can gradually shift the tide and build their democratic future.

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt, June30 | Tagged , , , , , | 2 Comments

Egyptian Aak- Week 38

Posted on September 23, 2013 by nervana111

Main Headline

Monday

Tuesday

 Wednesday

Thursday

Friday

Saturday

Sunday

 Good report

On Delga: Egyptian army offers no respite for southern town

Good Read

Plus

Why this four-fingered hand gesture could be bad news for Egypt’s future, and a rebuttal to the piece that is unfair and harsh in my opinion.

Finally, here are Jayson Casper’s  prayers for Egypt.

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt | Leave a comment

Week 37- A Few Thoughts. The Brotherhood’s New strategy

Posted on September 15, 2013 by nervana111

 A month has passed since the forced ending of the pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo. The widespread security crackdown and the arrest of the Brotherhood’s most senior cadres have had a huge impact in paralyzing the main skeleton of the group and has limited their ability to function.

 How has the Muslim Brotherhood coped with this? It is important to look at other aspects of the Brotherhood’s structure and mindset that opponents miss or ignore. These factors are crucial to understanding how the Brotherhood survives. Two aspects are especially worth highlighting.

 First, many believe the widespread myth that Islamists in general, and the Brotherhood in particular do not read about other ideologies and foreign books. This is untrue, many Islamists read the “Infidel’s” books; mainly to look for ideas that vindicate their ideology, and tips that can be of help to their own goals. For example, many Islamists have read __ at least translated summaries__ of early Zionist literature, not to understand Zionism, but to learn from their success story.

 Second, some wrongly assume that that the skeleton of the Muslim Brotherhood functions in a similar way to a human skeleton with one central brain and many peripheral organs. This is mainly true in times of non-crisis, but the group has also implanted the mindset of their seniors into their junior cadres. This helps them to function independently if necessary. Therefore, it is futile to assume that the younger cadres will be reformists. In fact, they are nothing but an enhanced version of their senior leaders, equipped with innovative techniques, but running with the same old system.

 Considering the above, it is easier to read the Islamists’ evolving new strategy. Currently the Brotherhood and their allies are working on two fronts, domestic and international.

 Domestically, they have decided to update their protest strategy. In addition to the new yellow and black “Rabaa” sign that is now printed on T-shirts and banners, and the deliberate vanishing of Morsi’s photos from the protest scene, the Islamists have decided to adopt some of football Ultras’ tactics and slogans in order to add an Egyptian flavor to their protests with more cheerful music and animated cheers. They have also promoted more appealing slogans, particularly in impoverished areas like Hilwan, calling on local residents to stop paying water, gas, and electricity bills, knowing that this will resonate well among the public, particularly in the current, harsh economic conditions. Other measures of civil disobedience are also announced on some sites, including boycotting “pro-coup” businesses, local television programming that supports the coup, withdrawing money from national banks, encouraging public servants to take annual leaves, calling on families not to boycott schools, and for university students to protest at their own Universities. In short, encouraging wide spread defiance of the interim government, enough to call for a national strike at a later date.

 Internationally, Islamists has learned from Zionism that ideology ad finance are not enough, global lobbying is also crucial. Therefore, they have shifted their focus from old slogans that were used widely in the 80s and 90s, like “Islam is the solution,” to newer more appealing ideas that resonate better with a Western audience, such as championing democracy, political freedom, and of course being anti-coup, wrapped nicely in a passionate, well-delivered presentations. This lobbying effort is delivered by attending various conferences and giving interviews to a wide range of TV and radio networks. For non-Egyptian Muslim audiences, they focus on mosques. Toward Islamist networks in Pakistan, Turkey, and Gulf states, they enlist various supportive scholars, including persons like Sheik Qaradawi, who publically called on Friday for the Egyptian army cadres to revolt against army chief General Sisi.

 In contrast, pro-coup support groups are doing their best to undermine the Brotherhoods’ efforts, at least at the domestic level. State TV has changed the banner from “War on terror” to the softer slogan “Crack down on terror, ”with a strong focus on the ongoing militancy in Sinai, and linked this to the Brotherhood as a group. Other private channels have tried to cover the anti-coup demonstrations, and of course have highlighted how the protestors have attacked them and made their job impossible. The sole aim of this subtle change of policy is deprive the Islamists of the victimhood narrative, and tries to counter their appeal in the wider public, while the government continues with its hard-core crackdown tactics.

 Both sides understand that a substantial section of the Egyptian public are “swing- citizens,” without a clear loyalties, or political affiliation, and may swing towards the military or the Brotherhood depending on the evolving events. Winning those Egyptians is the ultimate task for both pro and the anti-coup groups. It is unfortunate that both sides are not willing to reflect on the ghastly events that have embodied Egypt since the ousting of president Morsi. Instead, this intense lobbying is going on, rather than work to embark on serious reforms of thoughts and practice.

 On one side, the Interim government is focused on the mix of security crackdown, nationalistic propaganda, and imposing a monopoly on religious preaching, but fails to reassure the wider pubic that it will kickstart a true, inclusive democratic process, or even reform the ailing economy. The government and its allies are also failing badly in selling their message to a western audience, and were only saved by the current western distraction with the ongoing debate about Syria.

 On the other side, the Islamists are only updating their tactics without a serious reflection on the past or a genuine desire to reform their ideology. Their new slogan of civil disobedience may sound attractive, however, it is highly unlikely that it will be seriously effective on the ground. It may be easy to boycott pro–government TV channels, but not public transport or the national banks.Today, most services of Egypt’s underground metro have worked as usual. Egyptians are already fed-up with uncertainty, and the Islamists’ policy of deliberately creating instability will be off-putting to many.

 Looking back again to not-so-distant events, the crackdown has forced the Brotherhood to adopt more long-term measures that may not yield immediate results, but will help the group to tread water in the turbulent sea of the Egyptian politics. The hope is that their new tactics will help them rebuild a ship capable of surviving and sailing them back to the shores of power.

This piece is also published in The Daily News Egypt

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt, June30 | Tagged , , , , | 1 Comment

Egyptian Aak. Week 37

Posted on September 15, 2013 by nervana111

Main Headlines

Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday

Thursday

 Friday

Saturday

 Sunday

Good Reports

Good Read

Finally here are Jayson Casper’s prayers for Egypt.

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt | Tagged , , , , | 1 Comment

Egyptian Aak-Week36. Egypt between The Literalists and The Opportunists

Posted on September 8, 2013 by nervana111

Main Headlines:

Monday

 Tuesday

 Wednesday

 Thursday

 Friday

Saturday

Sunday

A Few Thoughts

One of the most intriguing arguments that I have heard about in support of the forced ending of the pro-Morsi sit-ins at Rabaa and Nahda, is the story of the Derar mosque. This story is quoted in the Quran’s Al-Tawbah Sura (chapter), verse 107 and 108, in which God described those who occupied Derar mosque as hypocrites, disuniting believers, “They will indeed swear that their intention is nothing but good; but Allah declare that they are certainly liars.” Upon receiving this verse, Prophet Mohamed sent some of his companions to burn down Derar mosque.

 It s pointless to discuss the background of the Derar mosque, as it is like many stories mentioned in the Quran, open to various interpretations. Nonetheless, it is interesting that it has been picked up by some anti-Muslim Brotherhood Islamists to justify the forced ending of the sit-ins. Weren’t those in Rabaa inciting against the larger society? Feeding hatred? Undermining the foundation of the state? In their minds, the answers are yes to the above questions, and the story of Derar gives the right pretext to sanction the police interventions. Needless to say, the pro-Muslim Brotherhood vociferously dismisses that argument and call out their opponents as hypocrites that betrayed the legitimate leader of the country. This story is just one example of the current battle in Egypt, a battle in which both sides are armed with verses from the holy book of Islam to justify their actions.

 If linking the Derar mosque with Rabaa is alarming, then the debate about Egypt’s new constitution is seriously worrying to say the least. The Salafi Nour party has decided to apply their literalistic approach to Islam toward Egypt’s constitution. In their opinion, words have to be clear and with a decisive tone. Based on that argument, they consider article 2, which imposes the principles of Islamic sharia as the main source of legislation in the country as unclear and un-Islamic, and they consider article 219 of the suspended constitution as a good explanation of article 2. They argue that the word “principals” was never mentioned in the Quran, Hadith, or in any of scholarly interpretation; hence they want either a clear stating of Sharia as “Quran and Hadith” in article two, or to retain article 219 as it is.

 Nour party’s literalistic view has already generated uproar in the non-Islamist camp. It remains to be seen if other scholars will find a compromise phrasing. There are rumors that the Nour party may withdraw from the constitution committee before the start of the formal discussion to avoid being seen as compromising on Islamist principles in front of its constituency; if true, then it will be another cunning political maneuver from the relatively novice Salafi party. Meanwhile Amr Moussa has been elected Chairman of the 50-Member Constituent Assembly, with ex- Muslim Brotherhood Kamal al- Helbaway among 3 others as chair people. It is worth noting that the Assembly that has no judges among its members, and is imbalanced in its composition with very few Islamists.

 Concurrently, there are also growing demands to separate religious groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, and even the Salafi Dawaa Salafyia from their political wings like the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice party and the Salafi Nour party. Many Salafi leaders seem to be happy with this formula, probably because they feel it will harm the Brotherhood more than them. Furthermore, the move to ban the Muslim Brotherhood NGO, officially formed only last March, but was running illegally for decades, is also aimed to undermine the group’s social roots. Separating preaching from politics, together with banning the Islamists’ formal social activities will harm the Brotherhood more than banning the formal Brotherhood organization.

 Policymakers inside Egypt’s current leadership seem to be of two minds about what to do with the Muslim Brotherhood. The doves are advocating a partially open window policy, allowing the Muslim Brotherhood as a political party, but not as an organization to practice politics. The hawks are advocating complete eradication of the organization. It is still unclear which side will win the debate.

 Against this background, the security forces are on high alert, especially after the failed assassination attempt against the interior minister and several foiled bomb attacks. Pro-Morsi alliances seem to be fighting on two fronts: thru persistent marches, hoping that these may gradually attract more crowds, while their supporters from radical Jihadists __or others___ have opted to try violence to undermine the current authority.

 It is important to understand that Morsi’s supporters are in desperate mood and are willing to gamble in order to achieve even a symbolic victory or a turning of the tide against the supporters of the military. It is worth remembering that the state of emergency is officially due to end on September 14th (two months after ending the sit-ins). Any extension, particularly of the curfew, will probably be counter-productive, and may swing the public mood against the government. The latest Baseera poll shows 73% of Egyptians do not feel safe, and 50% say incomes affected by the curfew.

 Managing this stage of conflict in Egypt will be challenging for the interim government and for the army leadership. It requires delicacy, finesse, and cunningness. The crowds that supported General Sisi will not stay loyal forever, particularly if they do not see any improvements in security and economics. Can the leadership understand that indulging in the security measures will play into their opponents’ hands? Can they understand that inclusive democracy is the best way to fight terrorism?

 Egypt needs urgent state building measures, in which there is a balance between security and freedom, and between politics and religion. Thus far, the country is still hijacked by literalists and opportunists from all sides, and if it continues on this path, Egypt will end up galloping towards either a police state or a failed state, with many stories, similar to that of the Derar mosque, usurped to justify future failures.

 Good Reports:

Good Read:

Finally, here are Jayson Casper’s prayers for Egypt

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt, June30 | Tagged , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Egypt Debates US Strike on Syria

Posted on September 5, 2013 by nervana111

I wrote this piece for Al-Monitor

As the debate rages in the United States and other Western nations about a possible strike against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a parallel debate is taking place in Egypt. Officially, the interim government has rejected any international intervention in Syria. The government’s stance is supported by many political parties, including the liberal Free Egyptian Party and moderate Islamists such as the Strong Egypt Party. The official stance has also gained strong backing from a wide portion of the Egyptian public. The mood now among Egyptians is hostile to any US intervention in Syria. Despite the ongoing civil war, the use of chemical weapons and the thousands of Syrians who were killed, injured or displaced, any US strike against Syria will be viewed in Egypt like the 1956 Suez crisis — that is, an unlawful attack by Western forces against a sovereign Arab state.

To understand the Egyptian stance, it is helpful to link it to the evolution of society after the January 2011 revolution. The last two and half years can be divided into three phases.

Read more:To understand the Egyptian stance, it is helpful to link it to the evolution of society after the January 2011 revolution. The last two and half years can be divided into three phases. To continue reading click here

 

Posted in Egypt, Syria | Tagged , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Week 35-A Few Thoughts. Egypt’s New Political Map

Posted on September 1, 2013 by nervana111

Published in the Daily News Egypt

The political map of Egypt is slowly changing. As events continue to unfold following the June30 and then the July3 coup, there are emerging new realties that may have an impact the future of the country for years to come. Currently, however, there is nothing definitive or clear.

 First, the ongoing crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood did not tame political Islam in Egypt. In fact, the opposite is true. Al-Azhar wants to be the sole guardian of Islam in Egypt, while the anti-Muslim brotherhood Salafis want to be the protector of the Sunni doctrine, and all the while the junta wants to enlist Islamism to serve their nationalist agenda.

 Both al-Azhar figures and Salafis are passionately defending the army, but they are also defending the role of religion in the state. In their opinion, the religion should not be abused in politics, but it should also not be banned. Pro-coup non- Brotherhood Islamists are fighting hard to weaken the most organized Islamist group in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, to capitalize on its downfall, and to enlarge their political base. Despite this, they are not united on a clear vision on how religion should be framed inside Egypt’s new constitution. The Salafi Nour party is fighting hard to keep article 219 unchanged, while other scholars advocate removing it. Interestingly, other “moderate” Islamists such as Aboul Fetouh have decided not to participate in the constitutional assembly. How all this will work out at the end is still unclear.

 Second, there is a new line of demarcation that has started to make a distinction between Militarism and Mubarakism in Egypt’s political sphere. Indeed, Mubarak was an army man, but his long tenure was associated with a subtle shift towards favoring the police and business elite, while sidelining or neutralizing charismatic military figures such as Gamasi and Abu-Ghazala, whom he feared could appeal to the public and challenge his rule.

 Now that the military is in charge of Egypt, its leadership is keen to dissociate itself from Mubarak, his policies, and his men. Subtly for now, they want to be prudent in their animosity to Mubarak while they are fighting on several other fronts. The release of Mubarak last week and the immediate house arrest order reflects the delicate balance that the military is trying to achieve. They do not want to humiliate their ex-leader ___ that is part of their military teaching, but they want to maintain their image as “the guardian of the revolution.” In addition, there was a palpable lack of enthusiasm about the release of Mubarak in Egypt state and private media. Another intriguing sign was the cold response to the news of the possible return of ex-presidential candidate Shafiq, considered as a Mubarak man, back from the UAE. One Egyptian presenter, Tamir Amin, openly asked him not to return back to politics.

 The new decree issued by interim head of state Adly Mansour stating that Egyptian soldiers will no longer swear loyalty directly to the president of the republic is an indication that the military leadership does not just want to create another Morsi or another Mubarak. The junta worships their independence from the state. This is one clear goal that Sisi wanted to achieve by backing June30.

 On the economic front, it seems that the new military leadership prefers a shift from Mubarak’s ___and to certain degree Morsi’s ___ neoliberal approach to the economy. Although the honeymoon with Mubarak’s Felool is still ongoing, it will unlikely last. The junta may not revert to Nasser ‘s extreme socialist approach, but they may prefer to tame the power of the business elite, mainly to maintain the loyalty of the apolitical public who resented the alliance between Mubarak and his businessmen.

 Third, the military coup has exposed the irrelevance of the various non-Islamist political parties in Egypt. All of them looked weak and ineffective. None have articulated any clear vision for the future. Instead, they all looked like junior pawns in Sisi’s coalition against the Brotherhood; a mere bunch of loyal, nodding dogs that release hollow statements, while their senior members rants on various talk shows. These parties even failed to capitalize from the crisis to widen their social base; none of them have travelled to the provinces or tried to engage with the public or listened to their grievances. How can they expect any victory against the Islamists in the next parliamentary election if they fail to show up in such a critical juncture in Egypt’s history? Some claim that their silence is deliberate until the current crisis subsides. If this is the actual case, then it is short sighted to say the least. The public will never forgive them for their cowardice and weakness.

 As for leaders like Sabbahi, many rightly predict that he stands a good chance in any future presidential election. His appearance on the al-Arabyia channel endorsing the army move against the Muslim Brotherhood and support for a new nationalist agenda for Egypt has given him prominence. The left is re-bouncing back in Egypt, aiming to refashion Nasser’s glorious past, but with a few modifications.

 If we are not careful, the future of Egypt may be in the form of neo-nationalism: a mixture of militarism, socialism, and non-Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamism, all mixed together in a parcel that is wrapped with only a thin wrap of flawed democracy, in which the junta are leading from behind.

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt, June30 | Tagged , , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Egyptian Aak- Week 35

Posted on September 1, 2013 by nervana111

Main Headlines

 Monday

Tuesday

 Wednesday

Thursday

Friday

Saturday

  • One army conscript dead, three soldiers injured in Port Said
  • The Muslim Brotherhood’s Sobhey Saleh has been arrested
  • Security forces arrested a top wanted militant in the Sinai
  • Al-Qaida in Iraq calls on Egyptians to fight army
  • Billionaire Naguib Sawiris stirs ire calling for 2-years protest ban
  • Egyptian authorities detain swan they suspect is “a spy”

Sunday

Good Read

Plus:

Finally here are Jayson Casper’s prayers for Egypt

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt | Tagged , , , , , | Leave a comment