Neither Erdoğan’s victory, nor the Muslim Brotherhood’s protests are an Ottoman slap

Published in Hurriyet Daily News

Following a trail of setbacks, Islamists in the Arab world have something to celebrate. Their hero, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has won in Turkey’s local elections, a victory Islamists in the Arab world are selling to their followers as their own.

The relationship between Erdoğan and his Arab Islamists is based on mutual exploitation. Erdoğan engineers more domestic popularity for himself by harping on the misfortunes of Islamists. At the same time, Arab Islamists market Erdoğan’s success as proof of the soundness of their ideology, and use his success as a tool to counter misgivings among their junior cadres and supporters.

The essence of this relationship is a mutual feed of victimhood that serves both sides’ interests. Despite the fact that most Arab Islamists acknowledge Erdoğan’s brand of political Islam (which does not promote Sharia) as being different to their own, they have lowered the bar and are willing to accept his “less than perfect ideology.”

Through first-class engineering, the Turkish leader supplies his Arab followers with the much-needed perception that he is the right man for them. He presents his facts, hype, and half-truths wrapped in a parcel that aims to entrench his followers’ belief of victimhood.

There is no doubt about the success of the perception campaign, and plenty of examples testify to it. These include the Rabaa sign (invented in Turkey after the tragic forced end of the Brotherhood sit-ins in Cairo), which Erdoğan has invoked repeatedly.

Then there is the Turkish Twitter hashtag #MısırdaKatliamVar or “massacre in Egypt,” referring to the abhorrent mass death sentences handed down to 529 Muslim Brotherhood affiliates, an event that was followed by protests across Turkey in condemnation of the execution order.

These strategies have worked effectively for Erdoğan, who, ironically, freely uses social media for his own benefit, but harshly criticizes it when it markets ideas contrary to his own. These campaigns are not aimed purely at fighting injustice, Turkish protesters were not reminded about other regional atrocities like the public executions in neighboring Iran.

Such a display of injustice is also used as a perfect shield that protects Brotherhood leaders from taking responsibility for their own failure to govern Egypt or to confront the criticism of them from thinkers such as Tarek Ramadan, who openly criticized the Arab Islamists’ rush to rule.

The current slogan that the Brothers are spreading among their cadres is, “Now is not the time,” and this slogan is being promoted indirectly by Erdoğan’s propaganda campaign.

On the other hand, playing the moral card was, and still is, paramount for Erdoğan. It does not just serve his grand Ottoman vision; raising the Rabaa sign and shedding tears for the innocents helps to reinforce his image as a defender of morality against evil enemies plotting his downfall — an image that worked well in the local election as a tactic to distract voters’ attention from alleged leaks and corruption charges.

Erdoğan chose to celebrate his victory in the local election by carefully picking an exotic metaphor from Ottoman history, “the Ottoman slap.” Arab Islamists fecklessly cheered for his slap, ignoring the fact that open-handed slaps were once used against their ancestors, who fought the Ottoman invaders.

Furthermore, the Islamists are now borrowing the metaphor to market non-existent achievements. In an Arabic statement, the anti-coup alliance in Egypt claimed their “million march” in Cairo was a “slap” against Catherine Ashton’s visit, which they viewed as hostile to them. Ironically, the “million march” numbered only a few thousand.

In contemplating the future of the Erdoğan-Arab Islamists alliance, the crucial question remains: How effective is the alliance, and can it continue risk free?

The dynamics in Turkey have changed subtly following the local election. The Turkish opposition has now picked the moral card, and is willing to use it too. The Turkish Parliament drafted a joint declaration against the Egyptian court’s decision on the mass execution of Brotherhood affiliates, and both the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) parties supported the declaration.

Although this declaration cements Egypt more inside the domestic Turkish arena, it is a direct challenge to Erdoğan’s super-morality narrative. Erdoğan, who was once accused of backing the ruthless al-Assad regime in Syria, cannot apply the same accusation to the Egyptian scenario. The Turkish opposition clearly does not back the coup in Egypt.

However, there are limits to the use of Egyptian injustice for domestic purposes: Its impact on the local crowd will either fade in time or feed into the flame of uncontrollable anger among Turkish youth, an anger that could prompt irrational violent consequences. Although the Egyptian death sentences will not be implemented, as it is a primary verdict in a long legal battle, the Egyptian authorities will be unlikely to tame their oppression of the Islamists just because of Erdoğan’s rhetoric.

The angry, pro-Justice and Development (AKP) Turkish crowds that simulate public executions in city squares may grow increasingly disillusioned with their government’s inability to reverse the perceived injustice in the Arab world, and may decide to resort to a more radical jihadi style to vent their frustration.

On the Arab side, Erdoğan has opted not to share his key recipe for success with his followers. As Sonar Çağaptay wrote, Erdoğan wins not because he sells ideology but because he sells good governance. Islamists in the Arab world needed a governance plan right after the Arab uprisings; however, “patron” Erdoğan did not help them on that crucial front. Even now in Tunisia, where Islamism did not suffer as huge a setback as in Egypt, Erdoğan did not make a substantive effort to help the country’s struggling economy.

Erdoğan, at heart, is a trader – a businessman; he wants followers, not competitors. His policy toward his Arab allies is the ultimate proof. He does not encourage Arab-Islamists to form a new platform that can appeal to the hostile, suspicious public in their native countries. Instead, Erdoğan is hyping their dystopian belief that the masses are behind them, which is simply untrue. The problem for the Brotherhood in Egypt is not just a bloody bunch of coup generals; it is far deeper and more complex – an inconvenient fact that is deliberately being ignored in the bazaar of shining perception.

Both Erdoğan and his Arab-Islamists have to abandon their pyrrhic alliance, and infuse a healthy dose of realism into their cooperative ties. Neither Erdoğan’s municipal victory, nor the Brotherhood’s angry protests are a slap of any kind. Erdoğan still has to face the challenge of the next general election, knowing that his nemeses, the CHP and the MHP, are bridging the gap between them ahead of future battles. However, Arab-Islamists do not need Turkish pain remedies, but effective recipes that can tackle their chronic maladies. Islamists need to redevelop a concrete project to govern, while Erdoğan needs to focus on his main appeal to the Turkish public: Governing effectively.

Posted in Turkey, Egypt, Middle East | Tagged , , , , | 1 Comment

Egyptian Aak 2014 – Week 15 ( April 7-13)

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 Good Reports

Good Read


 Photo Gallery

Finally here are Jayson Casper’s prayers for Egypt

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt | Tagged , , , , , , | 2 Comments

The Brotherhood, and Britain. The “terrorists or us” theory

The British decision to launch an investigation into the Muslim Brotherhood and its alleged links with radical militancy has sparked widespread controversy. Many people are justifiably surprised by the sudden decision and the possibility that it is politically motivated by Saudi pressure. However, more alarming is the comment made by the Brotherhood’s most senior leader in the UK, Ibrahim Mounir, who said (according to the UK’s The Times) that banning the Brotherhood would leave Britain at greater risk of terrorist attacks. The problem with Mounir’s remarks is that they are based on a dichotomous and perilous view that holds “it is either the extremists or us,” which is wrong, dangerous, and counter-productive.

 The “terrorism or us” theory has been touted since 9/11 and classifies political Islam into two tiers: moderate and radical. It suggests that any conflict with alleged moderate Islamists will automatically force followers to subscribe to more radical forms of Islamism. This theory resurfaced after the forced ousting of Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s former president of Egypt, and has now gained new ground in the UK following the decision to investigate the Brotherhood. Although the “target-one-target all” theory is plausible, it is based on fundamentally flawed assumptions

 First, the existence of non-violent Islamic groups per se does not stop radicalism. Yes, the Muslim Brotherhood is a peaceful group, but it has also not suspended or disowned the radical teaching of one of its main thinkers, the late hawkish leader and Islamic theorist Sayyed Qutb, who is considered the father of contemporary Islamist extremists.

 In fact, many of the group’s current members are proud Qutb supporters, and often claim they only support his earlier views when he was more “moderate.” The problem is there is no mechanism to stop people from switching from following the non-violent early example of Qutb’s life to following the more radical later stage of his life. Ibrahim Mounir’s contemporary views indirectly reinforce this pitfall. The Brotherhood’s mercurial link with Qutb’s radical theories is the weakest link in its claim of peacefulness. The group needs serious recalibration of its internal teaching methods, not just to dispute Qutb’s radical views, but also to openly fight them. Many people do not know that Sayyid Qutb’s brother, supporter, and promoter, Mohamed Qutb, passed away just this April, and was widely mourned in social media by many, including many so called “moderate” Islamists.

 Second, oppression is not the only reason for radicalism. Looking at the history of fundamentalism in Egypt provides us with some clues. In the 70s, radicalism resurfaced in Egypt, not because of Nasser’s oppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, or the execution of Sayyid Qutb during the Nasser era, but because of the foreign policies of Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat. Although Sadat opted for a softer approach toward political Islam and released all Muslim Brotherhood cadres from prison, his appeasement policy failed to curb the anger of the radicals, who disapproved of his foreign policy. The peace deal with Israel, and the alliance with the US provoked many Islamists, and ultimately led to Sadat’s assassination (by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad).

 Third, the twisting of Western motives by radical teaching is the core reason behind attacks on Western targets. Many Islamists have openly and/or discreetly viewed Westerners as hypocrites who want to pursue their own interests. In 1952, during the so-called “moderate” stage of his life, Qutb wrote, “The Islam that America and its allies desire in the Middle East does not resist colonialism and tyranny, but rather resists Communism only.” If Qutb were alive, he would probably respond to the various analyses by warning of a new wave of global Jihadism as an inevitable outcome of the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood by rephrasing his famous quote, “The Islam America and its allies desire in the Middle East does not resist tyranny, but rather only resists Al-Qaeda.”

 The problem with the “terrorist or us” theory is that it reinforces the idea of Western opportunism suggested by Qutb and it attempts to reduce the concept of non-violent Islamism to an ideology that only serves Western interests. If it is framed in such narrow terms, it will not be authentic or convincing to fiery youth who may reject it as non-authentic.

 Fourth, hyping fear. We must consider how recent, more daring Western actions are viewed, such as the French mission in Mali. The French, who directly attacked Jihadi strongholds and killed many radicals, have thankfully ended their mission without encountering any retaliation inside France. Undoubtedly, if the French Government had blinked after threats and accepted bullying by a clutch of extremists, they could never have embarked on their mission. On the other hand, in terms of the scale of provocation, the British investigation into the Muslim Brotherhood seems a much less provocative act that should not lead to retaliation.

 Bluffing and creating fear by hyping up situations are well-known tactics that Muslims and non-Muslims alike fall for. It is plausible that the Muslim Brotherhood is now playing the fear card because it wants to protect its own interests, but we should not buy that argument, as fear only produces unhealthy relationships based on suspicion and not trust.

 Fifth, Muslims are not headless chickens and it is doubtful that advocates of the “terrorists or us” theory understand how offensive it is for ordinary Muslims, or how it can generate new and unnecessary Islamophobia. Portraying Muslims as people who are willing to channel their anger into violence whenever they are oppressed is a demeaning stereotype.

 While it is true Muslims are sensitive to any attack on their religion, it is also true that the media has exaggerated most Muslim responses and extrapolated local responses in hot spots such as Afghanistan to wider Muslim societies around the globe. To claim that certain groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are the sole owners or sole representatives of Islam is a farce. The tragic events following the ousting of ex-president Morsi have proven one simple fact: not all Muslims are Islamists. In actuality, many pious Muslims do not agree with the ideologies of political Islamists, nor do they have a desire to enforce such an ideology on wider society. Therefore, subscribing to the political Islamist narrative of “terrorism or us” will alienate millions of peaceful Muslims around the globe.

 Will terrorists attack the U.K. in the future? Possibly, but it will not be because of the current investigation, even if radicals claim differently. Instead, it will be because of opportunities taken by some to target innocents, who will grab at any kind of flawed reasoning to justify their sick actions.

 Let us not succumb to bullies and their fear tactics. We need instead to stick to the values of transparency, accountability, and fairness. Britain had a history of collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1940s and 1950s. The current investigation is a chance to clear up the past relationship, and establish a new basis that prevents the propagation of myths and lies. It is also important that the British Government dismisses any “dodgy” accusations against the Brotherhood from Egyptian or Saudi intelligence, and pursues only reliable evidence against the Brotherhood.

 The world expects a better standard from the UK. The truth about the Muslim Brotherhood’s position should set a new, open and healthy approach that ends both Islamist victimhood and the Egyptian government’s paranoia. This approach will shield rather than expose Britain to terrorism.

Published in Daily News Egypt

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt | Tagged , , | 9 Comments

Egyptian Aak 2014 – Week 14 (March 31- April 6)

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Good Reports

Photo Gallery

Good read


Finally here are Jason Casper’s prayers for Egypt.

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Egypt: The state, the army, and the future

Following months of speculation, leaks, and predictions, Egypt’s army chief Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has announced his resignation, paving the way for a long-awaited presidential campaign. Sisi’s resignation, speech, and candidacy are unique in the history of Egypt. Although the country witnessed a coup d’état in 1952, it has never witnessed a quest by a Minister of Defense to rule in such a way. However, the latest development is a clear indication of the spectacular deterioration of Egypt’s civil politics, which has ultimately paved the way for the increasing involvement of Egypt’s military in “fixing” the country’s chronic problems. Many compare Sisi with Nasser, Sadat, or both, but in fact, the ex-Field Marshal will only be himself, a new brand of autocrat, still polishing and updating his style and his plans for Egypt.

To understand Mr. Sisi’s thinking process, it is important first to look back at past state-building efforts in Egypt, and the complex relationship between the military and the state, which can be divided into three stages.

 Stage one: A growing army within a growing state (1952-1967)

 The genesis of the first Egyptian republic depended largely on Nasser’s efforts to establish control of the military, administrative, and economic pillars of the state. By widening the selection process of military recruitment, Nasser transformed the relatively elitist army into a huge melting pot that absorbed Egyptians from various religious and social backgrounds, but Nasser’s authoritarian system mismanaged the process and his ambitions exceeded his ability.

Stage two: A severely weakened army that drained the state (1967- 1979)

 The 1967 defeat not only revealed Israel’s military superiority, but also severely weakened the Egyptian military, which had become increasingly dependent on the civilian government for logistical and moral support. A special military public fund was established for Egyptian donations to support the army. Even the legendary singer Oum-Kalthoum toured the Arab world and France to promote donations. The state’s administrative and economic revenue was channeled to help the military bounce back, which, in turn, severely weakened central authority and limited its ability to maintain public services.

Stage three: Rebounding army strength in an increasingly weak state (1979-2011)

 The military bounced back, mainly due to diminished defense requirements following the peace treaty with Israel. Ex-president Mubarak encouraged the military’s expansion of its business empire under the pretext of achieving autonomy within the state. He did this for two reasons: a) To prevent the shambolic dependency of the army on civilian resources that had prevailed during the early Seventies; and b) to indirectly serve a wide group of civilian beneficiaries who had been relying on the army’s low-cost products. This became increasingly important, especially following Mubarak’s massive wave of privatization and his abolition of various subsidies. The outcome was a mini-domestic interlinked military empire, albeit independent from the state.

On the other hand, despite 30 years of peace, the much-anticipated era of prosperity did not follow and the Egyptian state failed to bounce back. In fact, the legacy of authoritarianism, inefficiency, corruption, nepotism, and widespread institutional weakness that had plagued Mubarak’s Egypt continued unchecked.

 Following Mubarak’s ousting after the January 2011 revolution, the military initially opted to court the revolution and negotiate with the civilian parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the turbulence of the past three years, the weakness of non-Islamists parties, and Morsi’s inept rule have changed the military mindset. Now the military wants to “fix,” but without taking direct responsibility for its mess by fielding one of their men, while securing their independence and exclusivity.

The military’s new attitude is popular among certain segments of Egyptian society. It is understandable that 30 years of Mubarak have destroyed any trust in the efficiency of Egypt’s civilian governing body. Framing the narratives solely on army domination of Egypt’s political scene ignores the extent to which Egyptians willfully accept this formula. We have to admit that many see nothing wrong with the infusion of well-disciplined army manners into the undisciplined central authority. They do not care about the army growing a business empire, as long as this empire benefits them too, directly or indirectly. In a TV telephone interview, actor Mohamed Sobhy explained how the army would find contractors who would offer cheaper offers, as well as disciplined laborers, which would hasten projects’ timelines.

It is easy to label someone like actor Mohamed Sobhy as part of Sisi’s new personality cult. That may or may not be true (I simply do not know). However, it is crucial not to underestimate the populace’s deep sense of defeat of the civil spirit in Egypt. Outside the social media bubble and the revolutionary circle, many ordinary Egyptians have lost faith in their ability to perform and save the state, and Sisi’s camp of admirers and backers is exploiting this defeatist attitude. Nonetheless, the origin of this sense of personal defeat springs from the much-confused Egyptian psyche, damaged by three years of turmoil.

As for presidential candidate Sisi, his moves from July 3 to date reflect a man who keeps editing his plan on a daily basis. He knows roughly what he is up against (mainly cultish Islamism), but he is unsure what he stands for, apart from a very basic patriotic vision. He is open to learning from all his predecessors’ experience, but he is also willing to discard their failed policies. Fashioning his new vision is probably his hardest task, one that makes his ousting of Morsi seem like a walk in the park.

Therefore, after nine months of upheaval, it is time for civilian forces to stop wasting time diagnosing the mess (we all know what is wrong with Egypt), or draw comparisons with the past. It is important to understand that the current military – civilian imbalance will never change through street mobilization or political agitation. In fact, these tactics justify the authorities’ ruthless crackdown in front of the apolitical public. As Amr Hamzawy wrote, we should realize that the transition from our current reality to a future without civil and human rights violations will take a long time. It is crucial for civilian forces to apply more rational measures to tame the current authoritarianism, and convince the future president to edit his plan in favor of more civilian empowerment. This is not an impossible task. Even candidate Sisi has not finished his final plan for Egypt yet, and growing, smart civilian pressure can make this plan less ugly than is currently anticipated.

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt, June30 | Tagged , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Is Something Rotten In Ankara’s Mayoral Election? A Very Preliminary Statistical Analysis


This is a very interesting piece about Turkey’s local election by Erik Meyersson. I think it is definitely worth reading

Originally posted on Erik Meyersson:

Having today seen tweets on numerous alleged voting irregularities in Turkey and thanks to Twitter user @erenyanik I came across this CHP/STS dataset of voting data  in the Greater Municipality of Ankara, one of the tightly contested (less than a percentage point in the vote share) mayor elections between Melih Gökçek and Mansur Yavaş. The dataset includes 12,230 ballot boxes across 1,682 voting locations in 25 districts in Ankara. I didn’t collect the data itself and therefore this analysis should be taken as highly preliminary.

It all started when @erenyanik posted this picture plotting ballot box level AKP and CHP vote shares against the turnout rate for the Ankara mayor race. Several of the ballot boxes revealed turnout rates above 100 percent, which is strange, but also that these tended to systematically favor the AKP.

I decided to create a couple of graphs myself, and per request am now typing this very basic analysis up.

View original 853 more words

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On Egypt’s Mass Death Sentences

I know it is a bit late, but here are my thoughts on Egypt’s latest Judicial fiasco……

Egypt _____, a court in Minya south of Egypt, sentenced five hundred and twenty-nine Muslim Brotherhood defendants to death for the murder of a deputy chief police of the town of Matay. Following the verdict, a display of brief anger among the relatives of the defendants soon ended and the crowd went home. This muted reaction is in stark comparison to a similar, albeit smaller case, on January 2013, when a Cairo court sentenced twenty-one men from the city of Port Said to death for their alleged role in the massacre of seventy-four Cairo football fans in February 2012. The sentencing sparked wild outrage that turned the city of Port Said into a war-zone. The sheer difference between the two cases symbolizes the constant change of the Egyptian psyche since the January 2011 revolution to date.

 The early success of the revolution tempted Egyptians to believe in the effectiveness affectivity of street mobilization. They viewed it not just as a release of their long-term suppressed anger, but also as a way to pressurize the authorities to listen to their demands. Ex-President Morsi tried to restore law and order in Port Said by imposing a curfew on the city, but to his surprise, the curfew was largely ignored and was lifted a few days after. The army played a very cautious game and declined to force any tough measures on civilians inside the city; they just secured major points in the city and ignored civilian neighborhoods. Nonetheless, the incident alerted the military to the importance of restoring the barrier of fear that they erected between themselves and ordinary Egyptians for over sixty years.

 Following the ousting of Morsi, the military worked slowly but surely on restoring what they always portrayed as “the prestige of the state,” a subtle, albeit elegant, way to describe the installation of fear. The first step was the forced end of two sit-ins (Rabaa and Nahda) by the supporters of the country’s ousted Islamist President, Mohamed Morsi; the result was more than 600 deaths, including sixty-four policemen. Such bloody crackdowns triggered a vicious cycle of revenge. Islamists in the south of the country attacked churches and police stations, including the one in Matay, and killed its deputy police chief in the holy month of Ramadan. His death was a violent, brutal one by a gang of very angry Islamists. His death, along with the wide spread chaos in the south, did not serve the Islamists very well. In fact, it whitewashed the police atrocities in the Rabaa sit-ins in the minds of many ordinary Egyptians. The so-called “prestige of the state” became a popular slogan. While the outside worldview of the Islamists is as victims and martyrs, Egyptians, with a lot of guided influence from the local media, resented the Islamists and viewed them as “terrorists.” Demands for speedy trials to restore law and order rose sharply, and unsurprisingly were warmly welcomed by the military-backed authority.

 At the heart of this crisis is Egypt’s judicial system. As Nathan Brown  has described, the most important official in Egypt’s legal system is the prosecutor general, who ultimately decides whom to investigate and prosecute and whom to ignore.  The Brotherhood understood that and appointed a prosecutor general loyal to them during Morsi’s era; he was later removed after the president’s ousting.  This office has played an important role in Egypt’s controversial court cases from the trial of Mubarak, to that of Al-Jazeera journalists, and now this current case in Minya. Following the shocking verdict, the prosecutor referred another 919 Morsi supporters to a mass trial before the same court. Such hasty, almost farcical justice’s goal is not the deaths of the defendants; as most of the men found guilty were sentenced in absentia, others who were in custody still have a chance in the appeals court. However, the main goal is obviously as I mentioned earlier the installation of fear and acceptance of the authoritarian role.

One important point to remember is that such legal farce is not new to Egypt. Nasser set speedy trials during his tenure following the alleged attempt to murder him in 1954 and then later in the 1960s. Among those who were sentenced to death was Sayyid Qutb, the father of modern fundamentalism. Sadat and Mubarak would never hesitate to do the same, if they faced with similar challenges.

The risk now for Egypt is whether the policy of installing fear will produce only shallow, short-term results. Any brutal murder must be punished, nonetheless, without real justice for those defendants in the appeal court, the already tense communities, with easy access to smuggled arms (from Libya, and Sudan) can be transformed to insurgent groups willing to fight the central authority. The current calm in the south could very well be the calm before a strong, persistent storm. The relatives of the defendants may have quietly gone home after the court ruling, but in Upper Egypt revenge is a deeply rooted tradition.

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Egyptian Aak 2014- Week 13 ( March 24-30)


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 Good Reports

Good read

Book Review


Finally here are Jayson Casper’s prayers for Egypt

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Timeline of the Current Turmoil in Turkey

Erdo 5

(Turkish PM Erdogan addresses supporters on March 23, photo via Radio Free Europe)

December 17

December 18

December 19

December 21

December 22

December 24

December 25

December 27

December 28

December 30

December 31

 January 1

 January 2

January 5

January 7

January 12

January 15

January 16

January 17

January 22

January 27

January 30

February 4

February 7

February 8

February 11

February 12

February 14

February 18 

February 21

February 24

February 26

February 27

  • Montage wars over leaked voice recordings incriminating PM and son of corruption

February 28

March 2

March 3

March 5

March 6 

March 7

March 9

March 10

March 11

March 12

March 14

 March 20

 March 21

 March 22

 March 23

Turkey becomes first country ever to ban Google DNS

 March 26

  • Twitter says challenging Turkish ban through local courts

 March 27

 March 28

 March 30

March 31

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Egyptian Aak 2014- Week 12 ( Mar 17-23)

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Good read

Photo Gallery


Finally, here are Jayson Casper’s prayers for Egypt 

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged , , , , | 1 Comment