Has Egypt finally broken with the myth of the ‘good autocrat’?

Posted on May 26, 2012 by

Photo: AP

Initially published in The Telegraph

Eighteen months on, it is still too early to judge Egypt’s January 25th revolution. This was a unique revolution, transforming Egyptians from spectators into true players, who are now actively involved in shaping their country. But the revolution has not changed Egypt’s old political dynamic.

What is striking about Egyptian history, both ancient and contemporary, is how the country has been governed. All Egypt’s rulers, natives and foreigners, have shared an authoritarian mindset. They believed it was their duty to update the Egyptian culture and religion to reflect what they thought was the “right path” for their people. Saladin didn’t ask his people whether they wanted to abandon their Shiite beliefs, and Nasser didn’t obtain permission before spreading his Arab nationalism.

The act of luring Egyptians to accept a leader’s autocratic rule always depended on the leaders’ charisma and skill in winning over hearts and minds. For centuries, Egyptians believed in a myth of “the good autocrat”, a myth that is as old as the Pyramids: Egyptians accepted autocracy – as long as their ruler brought justice, wealth, and security to the people. In addition, any ruler of Egypt must possess absolute control over the country’s religious and military establishment.

Egyptians are deeply religious by nature. The idea that “the people of God know better” is a concept deeply embedded within the Egyptian psyche. By standing against religious authority, the ruler signed his death certificate. In ancient times, Pharaoh Akhenaten embraced a new religion and opposed the priests in Thebes; and in modern times, Sadat turned against radical Islamists. Both men had their lives cut short.

It was also crucial for the ruler to exercise full control over his army and grant their loyalties. Mubarak systematically rid the nation of any charismatic army leaders who might challenge his authority. A victory on the battlefield was icing on the cake. Nothing can ignite Egyptian passion and lead them to rally behind their leader better than having a common enemy. Saladin rallied the Egyptian people to fight the crusaders, Mohamed Ali fought the radical Wahhabis, and Nasser engaged in two battles against Israel.

So what has changed? Arguably, modernity was the first step in Egypt’s troubled recent history. It produced a new phenomenon: informal Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood, then later Salafists), who were not confined under the government-controlled religious authority. They promoted their own Islamic project in opposition to what they perceived as a Western-style decadent model.

As a result, and for the first time in Egyptian history, autocratic leaders failed to control religious players. They tried several approaches in vain: appeasement, persecution, merger, and takeover. All failed, and confrontation was inevitable.

The ancient policy of generals and preachers as one hand under one leader was transformed into the notion that generals and preachers as bitter enemies under different leaders, all consumed by lust for power, using the people to serve their interests.

Mubarak tried a different tactic: a “deliberate stalemate,” freezing the country’s political and intellectual dynamic in order to stay in power for as long as possible. Indeed, it worked for 30 years, but ended in explosive fashion.

Sadly, the post-Mubarak era has failed to end the old play; it just added a new act. The old dynamic is still in place but with new players. The revolution excised the tumour but failed to heal the cancer. The Egyptians woke up: they are certainly not spectators anymore, but they are still confused about their exact role.

What comes next is less clear: will the new leader be canny enough to merge the generals and the preachers under his leadership? Or will they continue to battle against each other like they did in the last 60 years?

Sometimes I believe that Egypt needs an exorcist to banish old demons from the minds of its people, and to kick-start a new era that’s truly different from the preceding 5,000 years of static old politics. The country needs a new political dynamic, without autocrats, generals, or preachers, with strong democratic institutions that engender respect for Egyptians as citizens. Whoever is the winner of Egypt’s presidential election, I am not sure he can and, more importantly, wants to take that role.

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My Egypt. Photoblog

Posted on May 23, 2012 by

Egypt is my native country, my heart  and my soul. It is where I learned how to love freedom and why I resent tyranny. Today Egyptians are voting for the future. I am here in Britain, watching them making history and  wish I was  with them. Here is my photo from my visit last January, the first visit since 12 years, and trust  me, it was very emotional.

My Cairo, my Egypt, so if you have never been,  have a look….

All the photos are mine,

The River Nile  Loved, worshipped and in many occasion, abused.

A sign post of US Aid project  in Pyramids area. Standing alone and neglected

The cutest kid in Giza

The Foul Car ( the food of the poor, but loved by the rich too)

Pyramids horses & Camels

Girls in Public secondery school. All Wearing Hijab

Girls in a private catholic school

A Niqabi woman , the new reality.

Girls from very tender age work hard to earn a living.

My school Yes, Italian !

Again, my school

Mar Morcus Church Heliopolis. You can call me an honouree Copt and this is my Church!

 I spent my childhood playing in its courtyard with my Coptic friends after finishing school ( just opposite ) so as far as my concerns, it is mine too.

sadly, at this visit, I was shouted because I took this photo without permission! how things has changed.

In Heliopolis, there is a church for every known christian sect. This is the Greek Orthodox Church

The Armenian Church

The Baron Catholic Church ( build by a Belgium Baron)

May Egypt stay a tolerant multi-cultural society.

Amen!

Posted in Egypt | Tagged | 5 Comments

Egypt Presidential Candidate Aboul Fotouh “Mr Relative”

Posted on May 11, 2012 by

When Einstein created his clever theory of relativity, he focused his work on time and space. Today, political analysts have extended the application of his theory to a completely different sphere; redefining political Islam. The excitement about the Islamic spring and the potential for political Islam to embrace democracy has seduced many in the name of relativity to label some Egyptian Islamists such as presidential candidate Aboul Fetouh as ‘liberal.”

Dr. Aboul Fetouh perceived liberalism is a good indicative of the current state of affairs in Egypt, where grey is white just because it is not black. In another words, benign conservatism is liberalism because we can swallow its milder rhetoric without feeling the urge to vomit.

For years, the mainstream religious establishment has resisted any reform of religious thoughts. Liberal scholars who advocate Ijtihad as the way forward to reconcile traditional texts with modern day life were mocked, bullied, dismissed or even worth murdered. For example; a reformist like Gamal El-Banna (despite being the Brother of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan el-Banna) was shunned by many, Nasr abu Zayd was forced to leave the country and settle abroad until he died, and  Faraj Fouda was tragically assassinated when he dared to voice different views. Many of them advocated reformation of Islamic thoughts, and tried (rightly or wrongly) to articulate different views of Sharia that protect the society without impinging on basic human rights. Sadly, these reformists’ voices were silenced in a country blurred by collective conscience.

As a result, there are only various shades of conservative Islam within the Islamic map of Egypt.

First, the Muslim Brotherhood:

a- The main group: Strongly committed to the group ideology and the targets and demands under the lead of their supreme leader and the Presidential candidate the group chooses (Shater or Morsi, it doesn’t matter)

b- the younger ranks who recently expressed some opposition to the group’s main chain of control and commands and demanded more freedom and flexibility. (Some of them may find Aboul Fotouh far more appealing than Morsi)

c- the wider group among the Brotherhood affiliates who endorsed the group in the parliamentary election, but they are not necessarily willing to commit to the Brotherhood and may endorse other candidates, like Aboul Fotouh, if convinced that his chances are better.

Second, the Salafists:

a-the hard-core Salafists: These are true followers of Salafi scholars who actually read religious text, study school of thoughts and actively involved within different Salafi parties. It seems that many of them will support their leaders endorsement of Aboul Fotouh.

b- the soft-core Salafists: These make up the larger group who choose to follow their preachers out of affection and trust without exploring the details of their perspectives. Most of the main Salafi constituents fall under this category. For them, Salafism is a general loose term that means embracing literalism as a way to achieve religiosity without venturing into details. How they will choose their candidate? Will they follow Salafists parties and back Aboul Fotouh? Possibly yes, though not necessarily.

Third, the non- brotherhood, non-Salafist Islamists:

This wider group of none-political affiliated Egyptians who voted for Islamic candidates in the parliament but are willing to shop around before voting in the presidential election.

Fourth, other groups like the Sufi Muslims:

They usually focus on the spiritual aspect of the religion and are naturally declined to join in politics. Their preferred candidate is still unknown.

It seems that Aboul Fotouh has scanned the Islamic map well and decided to focus on the milder version of each subgroup by adopting a more elastic rhetoric, vague, but smooth, calling for justice for all in a rather ambiguous Islamic framework. He may also appeal to non-Islamists under the pretext of his perceived liberalism, and by playing the all-inclusive card: “Trust me, I am a moderate.”

Yesterday, in the first ever-Preseidential debate , Aboul Fotouh reinforced what he already mentioned in his manifesto, a clear commitment to Sharia, but of course he didn’t elaborate on what exactly he means. The Maqasid ( goals) of Sharia as I wrote before is a very elastic subject that raises many questions. I doubt very much that Abuoel Fetouh has even thought about embracing liberal Islamic philosophy with its rationalism and freedom of thoughts; instead, he placed stronger emphasis on the justice of Islamic law, a very appealing slogan in a country rife with corruption.

The only hint of liberalism I detected from Aboul Fotouh was his support to the rights to change religious beliefs, however, later in the debate; he reiterated his opposition of  Iran attempt to spread Shia sect of Islam in Egypt. As a liberal I find that hard to swallow, opposing the brutal Iranian regime should not be extended to rejection of Islamic inter-sect conversion.

I wished Aboul Fetouh was quizzed about his views of Faraj Fouda & Nasr Abu Zeid, bthough I am not expecting him to embrace them, but he should at least protect the right of Muslims to voice different theological opinions without fear for their lives. No one should be murdered or persecuted for expressing controversial views in post–revolution Egypt. On several occasions, Aboul Fetouh has promised he would guarantee “Freedom of creativity” despite he has never articulated what creativity means in his opinion? I wonder how Aboul Fotouh stance regarding the elusive charge of “insulting Islam” and how he would prevent another Adel Imam saga?

So far, Abouel Fotouh vague platform has earned him the endorsement of many from “perceived liberals” like Wael Ghonium to various Salafi groups. It is certainly true, that most of these endorsements are based on political calculation rather than ideological factors. However, the ultra-conservatives can be potential troublemakers in the future if they perceived any delays in Sharia implementation.

Shadi Hamid described Aboul Fotouh as A Man for All Seasons and that Sharia for him “is everything and nothing all at once.” For me, that is not the description of a unifying figure, but a political hustler who are trying to appeal to wide variety of audience all at once. There are still plenty of question marks surrounding his assumed Liberalism, is it real or just a garnish for a very conservative manifesto? For now, he remains Mr. “Relative,” one who successfully proves the endless interesting applications of Einstein’s theory.

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The Salafi star at the Pyramids

Posted on April 26, 2012 by

 Initially published at  Egypt Independent

The popularity of the Salafi Sheikh Adel was surprising, particularly in the top tourist destination in Egypt, the pyramids. A planned two-hour visit ended up as a mission to uncover the legacy of this man. It started with a casual question about the winners of the latest parliamentary elections with one of the camel owners who constantly harass visitors, inviting them on an overpriced ride around the ancient monuments. I was told that many of those who make a living out from tourism in the pyramids area had voted for the Salafi Nour party and its candidate, Sheikh Adel, in the parliamentary elections. Wondering what made those who earn a living from tourism vote for a Salafi candidate led me to embark on a search for clues and possible answers.

Many link the rise of Salafism with two magic words: “the Gulf.” Indeed, many poor Egyptians have left their villages and rushed off toward alluring opportunities in the hot sun of Arabia.

What the Gulf (particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar) offered was not just money. It was a whole package of strict ideology, broken family bonds and a magical world seen through satellite channels. The results were a society challenged and pushed outside its comfort zone, losing its tradition. Embracing political Islam as the long-term solution for the chronic problems was simply inevitable.

With its strict monochromic vision (halal versus haram), Salafism’s literalism is an appealing choice to these communities of Egyptian expats in the Gulf for many reasons.

For one, the monochromatic vision of Salafism provides clarity. Once social distress as a result of the struggle for livelihood becomes the norm, clarity provides comfort, guidance and most importantly a way of life that is easy despite its many restrictions. One of the main tragedies of modern Egypt is the inability of many to distinguish between freedom and decadence, thinking that coercion is the answer to all of society’s ills; hence the appeal of Salafism.

Additionally, the more marginalized and neglected the community, the more it finds Salafism appealing. Those who live far away from the trendy Cairo suburbs won’t miss their swimming pools or golf courses. Most of the haram (forbidden) lifestyle simply does not exist in their daily life.

Islamic charity — foundational in Salafis’ work in the community — has a major impact in winning hearts and minds. Individuals like Sheikh Adel and his crude efforts to channel money from rich families to help the poor have earned him respect and admiration. I heard endless stories: the single mother he sponsored, the weddings he paid for and many others.

In fact, I felt a genuine and palpable love and respect for Sheikh Adel. One is highly unlikely to be praised after death without valid reasons. In a tragic twist of fate, Sheikh Adel passed away one week after his electoral success leaving many shocked and even distressed, pondering how they would cope without his much needed support.

The story of this fragile community is the story of Salafism in Egypt. Its victory was a direct consequence of the unconvincing performance of most ‘moderate’ Islamic scholars, perceived by many as government stooges, who failed to deliver a convincing case to the Egyptian public regarding the validity of the liberal tenants within Islam, and was compounded by their propensity to face up to radical scholars with their literal, context-free Sharia interpretation. In Egypt, public debate between scholars is virtually non-existent, and that in itself help radicalism to flourish.

Some predict a softer stance from Salafis once they engage in politics, highly unlikely in the near future. It took the Muslim Brotherhood more than 80 years to reach its current position, yet it is unclear how “moderate” it would be. The various shades of non-Salafi Islamists may have shown some pragmatic or semi-pragmatic views: they can advocate gradual implementation of Sharia, they even can show some flexibility in the writing of the Egyptian constitution. However, none of them has managed to produce a solid, complete non-literalist Islamic project.

The extraordinary events unfolding in Egypt may benefit Salafis — despite their divisions — far more than any other Islamist groups. They are the black horse in the current poisonous political arena. The recent disqualification of their presidential candidate Hazem Salah Abu Ismail may fuel more sympathy and support for their cause, plus their puritan views would continue to earn them credibility. Nonetheless, they are still politically novices, and would almost certainly struggle to reconcile their monochromatic views with the tricky nature of Egyptian politics. Can they survive as politicians? Will they resort to violence if they fail to achieve their goals? Only the future will tell.

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Islamic Law and Justice for All?

Posted on April 13, 2012 by

Also published as a guest blog on  CFR’s Steven Cook blog

I once asked a Salafi acquaintance, what he thought of Bouazizi. He paused for a moment then said: “he committed a major sin; he deserves the punishment of hell.” Then he added, “God has made from his bad action, something good.” I later asked a Muslim Brotherhood supporter the same question and his reply was roughly the same, except that he added “probably” in his verdict, showing slightly more sympathy and understanding.

Bouazizi, the Tunisian fruit vendor, did not just inadvertently unleash a wave of revolts throughout the Arab world; he also indirectly rekindled a heated debate about the compatibility of  Islamic Sharia law and democracy. This  debate is ongoing in Tunisia following the Islamic Ennahada party decision to rule out Sharia as a basis for the country’s new constitution and in Egypt where the Muslim Brotherhood asserted that implementation of Sharia law is the group’s aim and final objective.

The fundamental goals of Sharia, known in Arabic as Maqasid, aim to preserve the essential five basic elements of Islamic society: religion, life, intellect, lineage and property. These broad categories are in tune with basic human values, and they not contradict the principals of democracy. However, for Sharia to be a viable model for constitutional law, its interpretation has to be reformative, incorporating various elements of pluralism and human rights.

For example, in the classical maqasid, in order to establish religion, spirituality needed to be maintained and protected by following the divine law, as mentioned in the Koran and Hadith, and by adhering to Islamic rituals. This raises the question of enforcement: what about the freedom to leave religion altogether, which is considered apostasy by many scholars? Would the constitution include a clear legislation to protect people’s individual choice of religion? Will a maqasid-based constitution punish people who opt not to fast or who avoid paying zakat? Mandatory zakat was an idea floated by some Brotherhood members, only to be denied later.

The second maqasid is aimed to preserve life. The way to protect it is through the enforcement of prescribed penalties provided by the divine law. For example, murder, adultery, false accusation and suicide are prohibited in Islam. Again, how will an Islamic constitution deal with adultery, honor killings, and female genital mutilation? During their visit to Washington, the Muslim Brotherhood delegates were very defensive when asked about clitorectomy.

The third maqasid is aimed at protecting the intellect. Namely against anything that hinders the intellect’s ability to function properly. In this regards, alcohol or any similar substance should be prohibited. with this in mind, how far would the “Islamic” government go to impose an alcohol ban and what would be the penalty?

The list of questions goes on. For example, how would a Sharia –based constitution define “morality,” and how would an Islamic government impose it? Regarding the economy, how would the future Islamic government reform the banking system? How would non-Muslims fit in? Would they be forced to accept the same legislations?

There were several attempts to view maqasid in a modern perspective, starting with Muhammad al-Tahir Ibn Ashur in 1946 who expressed the need for an objective-based approach to Islamic law in light of modern realities. Other works by Gamal Attia and Jasser Auda even advocated reform, the evolution of maqasid, and the idea that the maqasid should be viewed as a dynamic rather than a static process.

Sadly, in the current polarized atmosphere in Egypt, the interpretation of maqasid varies drastically, with many parties still resisting any liberal or dynamic interpretation and rather preferring a cut and paste version of the 6th century model. This is precisely why my Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood acquaintance viewed the Almighty as a bureaucrat who would doom Bouazizi to hell. Ironically, both applauded Sheik Qaradawi’s Fatwa that sanctioned suicide in order to kill Jews in Palestine.

Adopting maqasid as a roadmap for the new Egyptian constitution is not as easy as the Muslim Brotherhood is trying to make it out to be. What the Prophet Mohammed presented to the world in the 6th century was a clear, progressive enlightened project that was far more advanced than what Arabs had before. In order to achieve the same results in the 21th century, Islamists parties should provide a new platform that is neither ambiguous nor regressive. This platform should maintain the delicate balance between the rights of individuals and their duties within the “Islamic” society in order to prevent hypocrisy, underground decadence and religious bipolar behavior that currently plagues many Muslim societies.

The Muslim Brotherhood still has a long road ahead to convince the public that its renaissance project is the way to go. Sticking to general slogans of justice and morality is simply not enough.  As the parliamentary majority, the Muslim Brotherhood  have a duty to engage the public in a debate about the interpretation and implementation of Sharia law in society. This debate may be awkward, difficult and daunting, but the dialogue is essential to ensure that Bouazizi and the thousands of revolutionary martyrs who dreamed about freedom, equality and justice did not die in vein.

Posted in Egypt, Islam | Tagged | 3 Comments

Dear Future President, what does Sharia mean to you?

Posted on April 2, 2012 by

When Egyptians went to the poll and voted for various Islamist parties in the recent parliamentary election, they were not after a fast-track ticket to heaven, but a genuine desire to fight corruption, decadence and nepotism that had been plaguing Egyptian society for generations.

Now, we have approached the final stage of the long, painful transitional period in post-Mubarak Egypt, and a new reality is unfolding- an Islamic -dominant Constitution drafting committee and a plethora of Islamic candidates for the upcoming presidential election.

Assuming that there will be no more surprises, and that the three main candidates- el-Shater, Abou el-Fotouh and Hazem Abu-Ismail- will continue with their campaigns, I think we should demand a serious debate between these candidates about Sharia law and the role of Islam in society. After all, they are promising Egyptians a better Islamic society and it is their duty to explain exactly what this is means.

I am very skeptical, however, about the likelihood of this debate ever taking place. Neither El-Shater nor Abou-El Fotouh would risk debating religion in public because they are primarily politicians who use Islam as a tool to gain popularity, and they never show any desire to enter the deep end and challenge the extremist’s mantra. Also, any debate about religion would almost certainly benefit Hazem Abu-Ismail who was once an Islamic preacher and would probably do his utmost to portray himself as the guardian of Islam and paint the others as opportunists (if he has the guts to do so).

I am persistent and looking for some answers. Those who believe that they can lead Egypt should articulate exactly what Sharia law means to them. Do they believe in coercion and why? In their views, what is the difference between sins and crime? Is freedom of choice part of Islamic teaching? which school of Islamic jurisprudence you follow? and finally, why should society enforce Sharia? and  most importantly, how your Shari- based platform differ than the others?

The debate about Sharia is as old as Islam itself. There was era of rationalism and other eras when rigorous dogma had dominated. Nonetheless, there are many Qur’anic verses that confirm that freedom is enshrined in Islam – one verse clearly states “There is no compulsion in religion.” The pragmatism of Caliph Omar is well documented, as when he suspend the punishment for theft (hadd) when hunger plagued the country, and how he stopped paying zakat- despite an explicit Qur’anic verse – to a certain group who had joined Islam without a deep rooted faith.

There are also endless examples of tolerant behavior, perhaps the most moving of which was when Abu-Hanifa the most outstanding jurist in Islamic history and the founder of the rationalist school of thinking, upon hearing that his drunken neighbor had been arrested and imprisoned for misbehavior, called on the governor and secured the man’s release and then he looked at him and said “Brother, we do not want to lose you at any cost.”

If our Presidential candidates really want to Islamize society, before they start to preach to the public how wonderful is their Islamic project is, they should articulate which Islam they are after and why. Sadly, even the so-called “moderate” Abou el-Fotouh has recently raised his religious rhetoric in order to gain popularity.

I have no doubt that the soaring rhetoric will only increase after El-Shater’s nomination, but I still hope that those who want to lead the country will stop using religion in order to reach the presidential palace.

How ironic that Islamists who bitterly complained about secular dictators imitate their actions by infantilizing their followers. Egypt has enough problems as it is and cannot afford double talk, contradictions or wishful thinking.

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No Shock and Awe: Israel should consider the Arab response to a military strike on Iran

Posted on March 18, 2012 by

Originally published in +972blog

On 7June 1981, Israel attacked and destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak. That was the day the Arabs lost their nuclear ambition.

The code name was, Operation Opera, but the opera wasn’t Nabucco and its chorus of Hebrew slaves, but rather Aida and its triumphal march. The Israelis had managed to catch everyone by surprise, and the result was a perfect example of Sun Tzu’s philosophy and Donald Rumsfeld’s infamous slogan “shock and awe.”

As Israel seeks to reaffirm its long-term strategy of deterrence and pre-emption 30 years later, we are facing a similar scenario; but this time it is the Iranians’ turn. The world is pre-occupied with the possible military strike against Iran and its potential risks and benefits. However, very few have considered the implications for the Arab world and how the Arab street would respond to such an attack.

There is no doubt that predictions in such crises are unwise and even foolish, though there are some realities in the Arab world that would be unlikely to change regardless of the outcome of any military scenario, even if this outcome were decisive, successful and without any retaliation.

First, forget the shock: in contrast to 1981, when many Arabs didn’t know about Saddam’s nuclear reactor and those who knew didn’t expect it to be destroyed easily, the endless debate and the tough rhetoric from various Israeli leaders have eliminated any element of surprise this time round.  Even my taxi driver in Cairo, during my last visit, asked when –not if —  Israel would bomb Iran.

Second, forget the awe: The young Arab men and women who defied teargas, live ammunition, bombing and ruthless murderers are very different from earlier Arab generations. They were not deterred by dictators; and they won’t be frightened by an Israeli strike on Iran. Deterrence, a policy that has been ingrained in the psyche of Israel since its establishment, is detested by these fearless youth who view it as demeaning and counter-productive.

Third, the Islamic awakening: Islamists in many Arab countries are the new emerging power. They have fewer links with Iran, but share its hostility to Israel. Their sponsors in the Gulf States would probably be relieved if Iran lost its nuclear capabilities but would not be grateful to the Israelis and won’t change their ideology accordingly.

Fourth, old players won’t disappear. A defeated Iran would certainly weaken its allies in the region, but would not make them vanish from the scene. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has established itself firmly with a robust financial, economical and social network. The Party of Godmight abandon the Almighty, but would not disarm and can cause Israel an incurable migraine.

Any successful attack on Iran would be just like the one on Osirak- a Pyrrhic victory.  Following the initial “we did it again” celebration, Israel would soon realize that it had replaced a loud, reckless, distant enemy with one located geographically closer, equally hostile, but not as reckless. Islamic groups in the Arab world acknowledge their inability to fight Israel in the near future, but they haven’t dropped the idea from their long-term agenda- yet!

The era of easy territorial conquest is past. Any future war would be urban, with many potential non-conventional players involved. Sooner or later, Israel would be forced to revise its long–standing strategy.

For years, Arabs and Jews have been locked in a bitter conflict. Rather than focusing on a viable solution, both sides have invested so much in a meaningless cycle of deterrence versus resistance; neither concept is decisive, but both are hollow. Therefore, the conflict is likely to continue until someone is brave enough to break the futile cycle and invent a different wheel, hopefully a peaceful one this time.

Posted in Iran, Israel | Tagged | 3 Comments

Egypt, NGO and the Green Passport

Posted on March 4, 2012 by

(Fourteen Egyptian activists who worked in Egypt with civil society groups stand inside a cage during their trial in Cairo on Feb. 26, 2012. AFP Photo/Khaled Desouki)

It must be a relief for all the foreign aid workers involved in the NGO”s case in Egypt. They were finally allowed to leave the country and be re-united with their loved ones. Their departure marked an end to their painful ordeal. On the other hand, their Egyptian colleagues were not as fortunate, their fate has not yet been decided.

So what exactly is their crime?  Maybe securing a decent job in a country plagued with high unemployment is a crime. Maybe proactivity and refusing to waste their time sipping coffee and tea and playing backgammon is a crime.  Or maybe advocating democracy and human rights in a country that has suffered from oppression for decades is the real crime.

After all, who really want true democracy in Egypt? The potential of a strong civil society can be scary. Some want democracy to be a game, a kind of cliché aimed at securing their interests and ambitions; others want a tamed democracy that does not threaten their power and influence.

The formal charges against those fourteen skilful, well-educated Egyptians are: receiving illegal “foreign” funding and working without a license.

So maybe “foreign” is the key word, but not every foreign organisation is under scrutiny. Part of these Egyptians’ misfortune is working for American organisations when the relationship between the U.S. and Egypt is, in high probability, heading towards divorce. With hindsight, they should have picked Saudi, Qatari or even Turkish organizations; funding and license wouldn’t be an issue then.

The xenophobic doctrine started after the 1952 revolution and Nasser rule. His idea of nationalism and patriotism was always mixed with anti-foreign rhetoric.  Nasser’s suspicion of foreigners’ motives led him to  “cleanse” them out of every Egyptian institution, even the film and fashion industries were not exempt: a quick glance at the cast of any Egyptian film from the forties would reflect the nature of a cosmopolitan Egypt that quickly changed from the late fifties onward.

Egyptians who worked with foreigners were also under surveillance. In fact, even a desire to leave the country for any Western destination was enough to raise questions, particularly for public servants (the vast majority of Egyptians under Nasser rule). Egyptians got to know the notorious “yellow paper”: a license to leave the country, known for its yellow colour and obtained from the Mogama, you couldn’t leave passport control without it. The unfortunate Egyptian had to obtain several signatures starting with that of his direct supervisor, and finally from an official of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), a long, tedious process that might take a few weeks, or even months.

Xenophobia had a new boost following the downfall of Mubarak, the messy transitional period having reignited the passion for conspiracy theories. The devious foreign fingers became the easy excuse for every set back.  Justice and accountability is a hard rocky pass, not convenient for many who want to maintain the status quo and are willing to sacrifice a few scapegoats for the sake of some short-sighted political interests.

The practice is also considered as harmless; after all foreign countries would probably search high and low for solutions to help their trapped citizens, including bail out and secret dodgy deal in order to solve the crisis. But who really cares about their Egyptian colleagues?  Well, after his or her immediate families, the answer is: no one.

As the anger about the recent NGO crisis has pre-occupied many in Egypt, some have viewed the problem from the perspective of the tense relationship between US and Egypt, focusing mainly on the foreigners involved. The plight of the Egyptians NGOs workers was overlooked, which brings us back to my earlier question: what exactly is their crime? Or are they are just unfortunate because they don’t hold an exotic passport?  Indeed, none of them hold a dark blue American passport, a burgundy red EU passport, or even a navy blue Israeli passport; the only passport each one of them has is the green Egyptian passport. Is that a bonus or a penalty?

Sadly, the Egyptian government has opted for lifting the travel ban on the foreigners involved as a way out of the crisis, rather than the more graceful and fairer option of dropping the case completely – or even granting an amnesty. This decision would lead to a trial in absentia of foreign workers with a verdict that would be meaningless as far as they are concerned. It also means that the Egyptians involved would have to face the painful ordeal alone, even considered by some as traitors.

I certainly hope this would not be the case, I have full confidence in the Egyptian judiciary and I look forward to a fair verdict, which would rectify this injustice regardless of the legal position of these organisations. If the US and Germany care about their sons, Egypt should care about its sons too. These Egyptians and their families deserve the peace of mind that their foreign colleagues and their loved one are currently enjoying.

Posted in Egypt | Tagged | 4 Comments

What’s next for Egypt,Israel and the elusive peace treaty?

Posted on February 26, 2012 by

Originally published in +972 Blog

The Camp David Accords, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty brokered by President Jimmy Carter, survived 30  years under ousted president Hosni Mubarak. But the treaty was never popular amongst the people. Will it survive in the post-Mubarak era?

 

 

When Anwar Sadat signed the Camp David Peace Treaty in 1979, he probably did not foresee that he had only two years left to rule Egypt and that his successor Mubarak would rule the country for thirty long years after. It is probably also safe to say that the Arab Spring would never have entered his wildest imagination.

To his friends, Sadat was a wise leader who had done the best for his country, but to his foes he was a traitor who surrendered Egypt to the devil.

The controversy about Sadat was almost, though not completely, settled by his tragic death in 1981, but his treaty is still causing quite a stir in Egypt following the downfall of his successor Mubarak.

How did it reach that point?

Mubarak, a man who lacked charisma and vision, but had a deep desire to rule Egypt as long as possible, formulated a devious policy on Israel aiming to maintain the treaty without risking the fate of his predecessor.

In order to achieve this delicate balance, he declined to formally visit Israel so as to avoid the wrath of the Islamists. On the other hand, he established strong and occasionally secret channels with Israeli officials.

On the domestic front, he adopted a more sinister policy towards the country’s Islamists. A mixture of carrot and stick approaches: ruthlessly crushing them if they crossed the red line, while turning a blind eye to the growing xenophobia and even anti-Semitism in their teaching – as long as they behaved themselves.

The long oppressive reign of Mubarak had slowly reduced the Camp David Accords from a comprehensive peace treaty to a mere deal about security arrangements and financial aid, resented by the vast majority of Egyptians, from the Brotherhood to the belly dancers. Peace became a derogatory word, a kind of retro 70s style that is neither desirable nor acceptable.

On the other side, Israel welcomed Mubarak’s policy: it reduced 80 million Egyptians into a one-man nation. A wrong choice indeed, as the Arab Spring has brought the era of reliable authoritarianism to an end, along with leaders like Mubarak who put a lid his nation’s simmering problems. Israel invested in the lid and ignored the pot. Now the pot is wide open and it is at boiling point.

What‘s next?

The abuse of the treaty is bound to continue. If pseudo peace was Mubarak’s preferred choice, the newly emerged Islamist majority in Egypt prefers an ambiguous stalemate approach; a more hostile policy towards Israel, hostile enough to sever any remaining links with the “Zionists” without provoking a new war in the region.

Their approach is based on many considerations:

First, it is very popular: the toxic mix of inflammatory threats and rhetoric against the “Zionist” entity appeal to many in Egypt, from the ultra-conservative Salafis to the anarchists and leftist activists.

Second, ambiguity fits in well with the Islamist comfort zone. Without the obligations of peace or the commitments of war, Islamists can easily navigate their policies between the US and the West on one side and their traditional allies like Hamas on the other.

Third, and most importantly, the geopolitical reality of 2012 would prevent Israel from re-enacting the 1967 scenario. Sinai comes with strings attached: a major trap called the Gaza Strip. Israel cannot re-occupy Sinai (assuming it easily do so) without confronting Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza, and inheriting the 1.5 million Palestinian inhabitants cramped inside.

However, the Islamists should be careful with their game plan. Stalemate is not as easy as it looks, it can backfire badly:

-Stalemate creates uncertainty, which could damage the already ailing Egyptian economy and put off international investors.

-It could encourage Israel to wash its hands completely of any responsibility toward Gaza, forcing Egypt to deal with its economical and security challenges.  The recent electricity dealcould be just the start.

-Israel’s response, particularly with any security breach from Sinai would be difficult to predict, but the possibility of Israel trying to partially annex parts of South Sinai (there are 4 security zones stated in the treaty, Zone C near the Israeli border being the most vulnerable) to secure its Red Sea shore and prevent infiltration from Gaza shouldn’t be dismissed.

In theory, Egypt may not lose much by adopting a stalemate approach, while Israel may gain some sympathy as result of it. However, both sides should calculate their next move carefully. In the current unpredictable climate, and the continuous deterioration of security in Sinai, tension can easily flare up with unimaginable consequences. Sadat’s peace has gone, and the war-free era may soon come to an end. Though a 1967 moment is unlikely, a modified new version is not far-fetched.

Posted in Egypt, Israel | 3 Comments

From Maspero to Port Said.The Endless Cycle of Violence.

Posted on February 11, 2012 by

(AP Photo/Muhammed Muheisen)

Clashes, death, anger and tear gas. This is the endless cycle of violence that engulfs Egypt these days. The rotten regime of Mubarak has eroded the entire foundation of Egyptian society and left a country with weak fabrics fixed with cement as dodgy as that used in many of Cairo’s sore-eye tower blocks.

What the regime left behind is a base that is not easy to eradicate nor suitable for repair. Mubarak’s men are not those “Felool” who everybody talks about. As a matter of fact, we all are in one way or another Mubarak’s men and women.  We grew up inhaling his poisonous air and following his pathological mind. We learned not to take responsibility for our own actions and shout “conspiracy” every time we face troubles. It seems the entire world is conspiring against us from the kingdom of Middle Earth to the mountain of Zion, at least, that is how it feels.

The Port Said tragedy is a clear example of how Egyptians failed to abandon Mubarak’s approach towards life and politics. Rather than sharing the blame (the fans, security forces and political leadership), many opted for the easy option, pointing their fingers at an illusive entity: ‘Mubarak’s men” (the Felool).

No one wanted to admit the unpalatable fact that hooliganism is not just among football supporters (the Ultras) but a general attitude that has risen sharply within society.

It is true that the lack of accountability and credibility that marked Mubarak’s rule has continued after his fall. The trail of events from Maspero to Port Said shared many similarities, mainly the failure to bring those responsible to justice and the inclination to initiate any reforms within the security service. However, there are several other factors behind these that contributed to the repetitive pattern:

First, loss of police respect and deterrence; Fear has been replaced by a deep desire for revenge and settling old scores. Even if  the police interfered in Port Said to restore law and order (which indeed they should have done), they would probably have faced by strong resistance and even bloody confrontations.  In the current climate, the police would be doomed regardless.

Second, insults become the norm among a wide spectrum of the society. Even among the so-called Islamists. Being religious doesn’t necessarily means good manners these days. Football matches are  feasts for the insults dictionary, where opposing fans take pride in provoking each other.  But once law and order disintegrate, insults could simply be fatal.

Third, and perhaps the most important one is the Leadership failure.  Other than poetic anger, pointing fingers and assigning blame, the newly elected (and politically novice) parliamentary members have failed to provide any solution or road map out of the current crisis. These parties are no less autocratic than Mubarak’s regime and have a sacred respect for their own chain of command. No wonder they view the world only from the prism of their parties’ interests.

Other political figures’ and groups’ responses were also disappointing, from ElBaradei who is literally sulking in a corner, to the non- Islamists who failed to rise to the occasion by offering any vision or plan.

Fourth, the activists: it was alarming to see the lack of desire from within the activist groups to address the violent attitude of the demonstrators or the futility of the uncontrolled rage. The clashes stopped only when the anger was finally drained, but it can be easily reignited at any time.

The recent cycle of violence begs the question; will the end of military rule end the violence and bring back stability to Egypt or have we passed the point of no return?

There is no doubt that the badly managed transitional period has contributed immensely to the current volatile atmosphere in Egypt. The military council has lost its respected status and grace, and it is time for them to leave power and return to their barracks.

However, there is a serious risk that the end of military rule alone might not be enough to defuse the current convulsive situation. A civilian president may indeed face the same fate as Tantawi, unless:

1- Police reforms start immediately to achieve law and order but with transparency and accountability. It is not a tick box exercise, it actually may take years.

2- Egyptians should give any new government a chance- a period between 6- 12 months- before judging its performance. No government can work under the continuous pressure of sit–ins, strikes and violent disruptions.

3-  Activists need to learn that blind rage is futile, that the fight against tyranny needs a calm mind and proper planning. Reflection on practice is not a sign of weakness , but a sign of strength.

4- Islamists need to understand that they can not have their cake and eat it too. Their defensive actions while gloating about their parliamentary majority do not add up.

5- There is no place for conspiracy theories in the new Egypt. The revolution has gradually turned into a sick soap opera, in which we are trying to uncover plots and find the perpetrators.

Conspiracies are like bugs; they only invade weak bodies. It is about time to build a strong society and stop using conspiracies as a scapegoat for our troubles.

We have to stop the little Mubarak inside us and put an end to his self-righteous attitude, his desire to dominate others and his rejection of rational thinking. Only then will the revolution prevail.

Posted in Egypt | 5 Comments