Any Vietnam in Yemen will not be Egypt’s Vietnam

Civil War In Yemen In 1962

( Yemen ‘s sixties civil war- gettyimages)

After Saudi Arabia and its regional allies started their air strikes against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, it did not take long for Egypt to announce its military support for the Saudi operation “Decisive Storm.” Egypt’s involvement in Yemen has concerned many, rekindling memories of President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s involvement in Yemen in the 1960s, which drained the country’s military and financial resources.

 In 1962, Egypt’s Nasser made a bold decision to send Egyptian troops to Yemen to support the Yemeni Republican coup d’état against the ruling Imam, who was backed by Saudi Arabia. Yemen’s war between the royalists and nationalists continued for years, draining Egypt’s military and economic capabilities and deepening the animosity between Nasser’s regime in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which rejected his socialist agenda.

 Like any military intervention, Egypt’s involvement in Yemen poses explicit risks and raises valid reasons for concern, but that is where the comparison with the past ends. The current confrontation in Yemen involves different players with different dynamics and contrasting objectives. These differences are too substantive to make any comparison between Egypt’s previous involvement in Yemen and its current participation.

 First, this is not Egypt’s war. The declaration of war was initiated by Saudi Arabia, not Egypt. The Saudis have clearly opted to take the lead in this war, thus assuming responsibility and bear the brunt of any consequences. They have managed to garner a huge coalition, including the rest of the Gulf Union, excluding Oman, Jordan, and Morocco. They also have logistical support from the U.S. and Turkey. Egypt is just one of a long list of participants. As Simon Henderson has written, this is Saudi Arabia’s big gamble. Therefore, victory or defeat will be mainly for the Saudis to claim. Analysts have labeled Nasser’s war in Yemen as “Nasser’s Vietnam.” Now, a new Vietnam in Yemen will be Saudi Arabia’s Vietnam, not Egypt’s.

 Second, Egypt is not fighting the Saudis in the current war in Yemen but fighting with them. Does it matter? Off course it does. The main challenge that faced Egypt in its past war in Yemen was the endless supply of arms and logistics, which the royalist camp comfortably received from Saudi Arabia along the 1,800 km border between the two countries. In contrast, logistical support for the Egyptian troops had to come all the way from Egypt. The situation has now been reversed in Yemen. The Houthi rebels are the ones who are relying on supplies from far away Iran. The air and naval siege imposed by the Saudis will compound their vulnerability.

 Iran may criticize the Saudis’ interference in Yemen, but it would be suicidal for the Iranians to embark on an open confrontation in Yemen, while they are already deeply involved in Syria and Iraq. Logistically, moving their military from the Persian (Arabian) Gulf into the Red Sea is a hazardous journey that is vulnerable and risky. Moreover, in the past, Iran has opted not to get directly involved against the Saudis. Bahrain is just one example. In March 2011, Saudi Arabia mobilized its troops in support of the Sunni Bahraini king, while Iran opted to stay silent and watch the oppression of Bahrain’s Shias. At this crunch time there is no reason to believe the Iranians will change this policy of silence against the Saudis. Yemen may be a desired trophy for the Mullahs, but not the main crown they are after.

 Third, the rationale for Egypt’s current military participation in Yemen is not ideology or risks to the Suez Canal, as some have stated; it is more a simple acknowledgment that the leadership in Cairo cannot afford to say no to Saudi Arabia. Let’s face it, Egypt has already received billions in support from the Gulf States, mainly Saudi Arabia, which saved it from bankruptcy, following the removal of ex-President Morsi and the instability that followed that almost crippled Egypt’s economy. Other factors may have contributed to Egypt’s decision, namely the desire to regain its regional importance, revive its naval power, and give a strong message to its enemies elsewhere that it is not shying away from using its forces. Nonetheless, the core reason behind Egypt’s participation is its membership within the Saudi camp.

 Decisive Storm is not an operation to stabilize Yemen; it is an operation to restore the Saudis’ eroded pride in the face of Iran’s growing dominance in the region. That does not make Egypt’s new Yemeni adventure right or acceptable; it just differentiates it from past experiences. Like any war, there are risks. Civilian and military casualties, friendly fire, guerrilla warfare, and mission creep. All are valid risks that should be discussed, but without cherry picking past events that can cloud our judgment of the present challenges.

 Therefore, it is important for President Sisi to be unambiguous with the Egyptian public and clearly explain what the goals in Yemen are and how they will be achieved. Egyptians have already witnessed instability and death of their loved ones in both Sinai and Libya; they do not need more body bags coming back from Yemen. It is paramount for Egypt to acknowledge the asymmetry between its goals in Yemen and those of the Saudis and maneuver a policy that make Saudi Arabia’s “Decisive Storm” less stormy for Egypt.

Posted in Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen | Tagged , , , , , , , , , | 3 Comments

Egyptian Aak 2015 – Week 12 ( March 16 – 22)

 

CAiYshgWQAAqrn7.jpg-large

( Solar eclipse as viewed from Cairo, via Mada Masr)

Main Headlines

 Monday 

 Tuesday

Wednesday

Thursday 

 Friday

 Saturday

 Sunday

 Good Reports

 Good Read

Photo Gallery

 Interview

Plus

Tweets about Egypt

Finally here are Jayson Casper’s prayers

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt | Tagged , , , , , , | 3 Comments

On Islam and Apostasy

Initially published in The What And The Why

Syria 636 AD ___The Ghassanid Arab East Mediterranean Christian Kingdom and its King, Jabalah Ibn al-Aiham, faced a challenging ordeal after the Arab conquest. Should they stay Christians under the new Muslim rule and lose their prestigious position granted by the previous Byzantine rulers, or should they convert to a new faith they knew little about?

King Jabalah Ibn-al-Aiham initially decided to please the new Arab ruler, Caliph Omar, and convert to Islam. Various historical texts dispute what happened next; however, all texts agree that King Jabalah Ibn-al-Aiham later decided to leave Islam. He fled from Muslim-controlled areas after Caliph Omar threatened him with death as punishment for his apostasy.

I remember King Jabalah’s story every time I read about a case of apostasy or blasphemy. Countless tales exist from the infamous case of writer, Salman Rushdie , and the Iranian fatwa against him over the book Satanic Verses to the current ordeal of the Saudi blogger, Raif Badawi, who was sentenced to a decade in prison and 1,000 lashes for insulting Islam.

A court in Mauritania has condemned blogger, Mohamed Cheikh Ould Mohamed, to death for insulting the Prophet Muhammad. In Bangladesh, a prominent American blogger of Bangladeshi origin, Avijit Roy, was hacked to death with machetes by unidentified assailants in Dhaka. Moreover, in Pakistan alone, an estimated 1,274 people have been charged under stringent blasphemy laws since 1986. In 2013, Amnesty International expressed alarm over the increase in criminal blasphemy cases in Egypt. Recently, the Egyptian prosecutor has referred a female writer, Fatima Naoot, to trial for insulting Islam.

The debate on apostasy and blasphemy as well as the punishments for these acts is not new. However, duelling sides resurface when a new case is presented in the Muslim world. To be clear, no cited and clear earthly punishment exists in the Quran for apostasy (defined as leaving Islam) or blasphemy (defined as insulting Islam). In fact, the word blasphemy is never mentioned in the Quran. The Muslim Holy Book only mentions punishment in the afterlife. This theme of after-life punishment is not alien to how Judaism and Christians view non-believers and defectors.

Furthermore, no record exists of the Prophet punishing anyone for blasphemy; in fact, the opposite is true. When the poet, Suhai Ibn Amr, who composed poetry blaspheming the Prophet, was taken as a prisoner of war after the battle of Badr, the Prophet asked his companions to show him kindness. Despite the Prophet’s demonstration of benevolence and lack of clear reference to earthly punishment in the Holy Book, increasingly more contemporary accusations of blasphemy and/or apostasy are making the headlines in the Muslim world today.

Why has such intolerance taken hold in the Muslim world?

The reasons are many. First, advocates of punishment for apostasy and blasphemy cite a Hadith (Prophet saying) that states, “If somebody changes his religion, kill him.” This saying has been used as a blanket pretext for punishment. Nonetheless, many ancient and contemporary Muslim scholars have challenged the current orthodox Islamic concept of apostasy and blasphemy.
The problem is that these arguments circulate only among elite and academic circles, and they have failed to spread to the legal system in Muslim countries. The result is a legal system that claims to be based on Islamic law, but is full of black holes where anyone who feels a valid case for apostasy or blasphemy exists can file a court case. It is then up to the judge to deliver a strict or lenient verdict.
However, many judges tend to be zealous in their verdicts to protect themselves from domestic criticism.

Second, Muslim jurists originally articulated a punishment designated for apostasy and blasphemy during the very turbulent genesis of the Islamic empire. Defection, switching loyalties, and criticism were always within a political context that coloured the crime and often the punishment. The story of Jabalah Ibn-al-Aiham is one example. In this account, Caliph Omar, the Muslim ruler reportedly threatened Jabalah with death based not on true religious reasons, but on a politically motivated attempt to prevent any potential revolt by Jabalah’s supporters in the conquered territories. The distinction between religious and political elements in judging apostasy and blasphemy is lost to most Muslim jurists today. In fact, apostasy and blasphemy are used as a weapon to punish modernist thinkers who try to liberalize Islam from the orthodox doctrine.

Third, and more importantly, the political climate in the Muslim world supports an environment where accusations of blasphemy and apostasy flourish. It easy to take any critical thinking as blasphemous, especially in societies where criticizing the ruler is considered blasphemy.
In Pakistan, prior to the 1986 blasphemy law introduced by General Zia ul Haq, only 14 cases of alleged blasphemy had been reported. In Egypt, the January 2011 revolution and the call for freedom did not tame the religious fervour that has been slowly emerging since the 1970s. During president Morsi’s tenure, a court sentenced a blogger to three years in prison for blasphemy and contempt of religion. Later, the ousting of the Brotherhood’s President Morsi did not change the zealous climate. Writer, Fatima Naoot’s, backing of the military takeover in July 2013also did little to protect her from criticism and trial.

Oddly, on the other hand, Egypt’s al-Azhar has refused to declare the Islamic State (ISIS) an apostate. In a statement last December, al-Azhar said, “No believer can be declared an apostate, regardless of his sins.” Although this statement is theologically logical, it is deeply alarming, especially when radical groups such as ISIS continue to commit brutal acts like beheadings, rape, and destruction of cultural heritage.

If we are not going to question the faith of barbarians, how can we justify questioning the faith of intellectuals? Bold and daring views should trigger public discussions; not public executions.
It is about time that the Muslim world re-visits the concept of apostasy and blasphemy in a way that aligns with the true merciful spirit of Islam. Islam is neither an emotional entity that can be insulted, nor is it so fragile that a blog article or a Facebook comment can challenge it.
Jabalah ibn-al-Aiham’s apostasy did not weaken ancient Islam. Salman Rushdie’s book did not weaken contemporary Islam. The same is true for all the other recent blasphemy cases. In this era of social media and globalization, Muslims cannot stop every critical thought. Instead, Muslims can learn to take the higher moral ground, rather than retorting with zealous, emotional responses.

Posted in Best Read, Egypt, Islam | Tagged , , , , , , | 5 Comments

Egyptian Aak 2015 – Week 11 ( Mar 9-15)

 

CADsOAbUMAEsF3R

(Egypt’s economic conference, via Ahram online)

Main Headlines

Monday

Tuesday

 Wednesday

Thursday

Friday

 Saturday

 Sunday 

 Good Reports

Good Read

 Profile

Video

Interview

 Photo Essay

Tweets about Egypt’s Economic Summit 

 

 

 

 

Plus

B_895u9WMAAOs1e.jpg-large

Finally here are Jayson Casper’s prayers for Egypt

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt | Tagged , , , , | 2 Comments

New Players on the Gaza Front

2015-635610876761317646-131

                                      (Islamic Jihad’s Ramadan Shallah)

The growing hostility between Egypt and the Palestinian group Hamas, especially following an Egyptian court’s verdict that listed Hamas as a terrorist organization, has placed other Palestinian players in the limelight, particularly the Gaza-based Islamic Jihad movement and the exiled political leader and Gaza native, Mohammad Dahlan.

A few days after the court verdict, a delegation from Islamic Jihad, including the group’s Secretary-General, Ramadan Shallah, and his deputy, Ziyad Al-Nakhalah, arrived in Cairo to meet with the head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Agency, Major General Khaled Fawzi. According to Egypt’s semi-official al-Ahram newspaper, Islamic Jihad has shown more flexibility in dealing with Cairo than Hamas has. Indeed, as I wrote last August, Islamic Jihad has managed to maintain a relatively good relationship with Egypt’s President Sisi.

 Islamic Jihad played an important role in the Cairo mediations that ultimately led to the Gaza ceasefire agreement between the Israeli and Palestinian factions last year. Now the group is positioning itself as a credible broker between Hamas and Egypt. Jihad’s main goal is to prevent any further escalation in animosity between Egypt and Hamas and to open the Rafah crossing Egypt closed last October following a major terrorist attack in Sinai. Islamic Jihad’s mediations seem to have worked. Two interesting moves have followed the delegation’s visit to Cairo: First, Egypt has decided to open the Rafah border temporarily; second, Egypt’s Litigation Authority has appealed the earlier court ruling declaring Hamas a “terrorist” organization.

 Another interesting player has re-emerged in the Palestinian arena ___ Mahmoud Dahlan, ex-Fatah leader, Gaza’s ex- security chief, and Yasser Arafat’s former advisor, who currently lives in exile in Abu-Dhabi. It is hard to sum up Dahlan in a few lines, but he is a shrewd and ambitious politician. He is everyone’s enemy, but is still willing to deal with everyone. In an interview with Newsweek last week, Dahlan made it clear he was using money and political connections to regain relevance in Gaza. As Hazem Balousha wrote in al-Monitor, Hamas and Dahlan need each other. Dahlan cannot work in Gaza without Hamas approval, while Hamas ___ or at least part of its leadership ___ is willing to accept Dahlan’s increasing “humanitarian” activities in Gaza.

B_BPWsZUwAADqsw

(Mohammad Dahlan)

 Dahlan has claimed credit for the brief opening of the Egyptian-Rafah border crossing in January, saying the move came after he visited Egyptian officials. “The opening of the Rafah crossing to students, patients, Palestinians living abroad, and holders of foreign passport is only a first step in a series of measures adopted by the Egyptian leadership during my recent visit to Egypt,” he wrote on his Facebook page. In another interview last February with France 24, Dahlan said: “The opening of the Rafah border has nothing to do with Hamas. Anyone who can help relieve the misery of the Gazans should go to Egypt and negotiate; those who can’t [clearly referring to Hamas] should keep quiet.” In other words, Dahlan’s aim is to dissociate the Rafah crossing issue from broader inter-Palestinian differences. Smart idea, but unlikely to materialize on the ground.

 Both Dahlan and Islamic Jihad can succeed in achieving a temporary understanding. However, their abilities to reach sustainable long-term solutions that can ease the pain of Gaza are limited by the three main players who can save Gaza: Hamas, the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas, and Egypt.

 Groups affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) still operate under the watchful eye of Hamas in Gaza and in Sinai, which is a serious challenge for Egypt’s national security. Moreover, there are reports of Hamas drones allegedly entered the Egyptian airspace. Hamas possibly wants to test its drone in vulnerable Sinai, away from Israel’s anti-missile defense. The reason behind Hamas’s unwillingness to play an honest game with Egypt is twofold: On the one hand, it stems from Hamas’s ideological loyalty to the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey’s regional camp that is hostile to the new regime in Egypt. On the other hand, Hamas hopes it can break the siege from the Israeli side. According to the Times of Israel, Hamas recently sent a series of messages to Israel indicating interest in a ceasefire lasting several years, in exchange for an end to the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip. However, Hamas has issued a denial, not of the proposal itself but that Hamas offered it or has approved it [yet]. Regardless of the details, the chance that such a proposal would succeed is very low. It is almost impossible for the Israeli Government to offer any concessions to Hamas during election time. Even after the election, Israel’s new leadership will have little incentive to compromise or change the current low-cost formula of “calm for calm.”

 Another player is Palestinian President Abbas, who seems to be more preoccupied with his own survival, as he fears a plot is being hatched against him, according to Adnan Abu Amer. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has been arresting Hamas activists and partisans of Mohammed Dahlan. For Abbas, securing the West Bank ____ not Gaza____ is his number one priority.

 For its part, Egypt is playing for time, squeezing Hamas slowly by closing the border and creating a security buffer zone with Gaza. In spite of the closure, Egypt does open the border for short periods occasionally to give mediators access and to avoid international criticism.

 To sum up, in addition to the main players – Egypt, Hamas, and President Abbas – the Gaza conundrum has two new players: Islamic Jihad and Dahlan. Each has it own agenda and focuses only on its own interests. It is hard to predict how all these maneuvers will work for the people of Gaza, but it seems almost certain that the siege of Gaza will not be eased soon.

Posted in Egypt, Gaza, Hamas | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

The case of Mehmet Baransu: Criminalisation of journalism in Turkey under way

Originally posted on TEMPORAL:

What should one say if the majority of the media in Turkey report on the detention of a journalist on spying charges in an affirmative manner, some of them even applauding the court’s ruling, as if to say he deserved it?

What would, for example, Glenn Greenwald think if he were to be subjected to such a shameful act of selling out by his colleagues on the Edward Snowden leaks?

The journalist in this case is Mehmet Baransu, a colleague to whom a large amount of military documents were leaked by a whistleblower. He published a series of stories in the Taraf daily based on that information, which led to the famous Sledgehammer trial. The main accusations directed at high-ranking officers were about plotting a coup to topple the elected Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government in 2003. About 300 of those accused were sentenced to prison terms and…

View original 522 more words

Posted in Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Egyptian Aak 2015- Week 10 (March 2-8)

Mahmoud ramadan

(A combo of image grab taken from a video uploaded to YouTube on July 5, 2013 during clashes between opponents and supporters of deposed Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi. One of them, a Morsi’s supporter, Mohamed Ramadan was executed on Saturday)

Main Headlines

 Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday

Thursday

 Friday

Saturday

Sunday

 Good Reports

Good Read

Plus:

Video

Finally here are Jayson Casper’s prayers for Egypt

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt | Tagged , , , , , | 2 Comments

For Hamas, Egypt is now the new “Israel”

40.si

(Photo via Reuters)

For the Egyptian leadership and Hamas, February was a particularly bad month. The tension between the two sides has reached tipping point. The cascade of escalating events started with a court verdict listing Hamas’s armed wing as a terrorist organization and ended with another court verdict listing the entire Hamas group as a terrorist organization. This last verdict, however, is not final and may be subsequently squashed. Nonetheless, the possibility of immanent confrontation between the two sides seems close at hand. Despite this, the Egyptian leadership appears oblivious and ill prepared for such a scenario.

 After the ousting of ex-president Morsi, Egypt began to view Gaza as national security threat. Egypt accused Hamas of conspiring to overthrow the Egyptian regime and backing of al Qaeda-linked militant groups, which have stepped up attacks against security forces in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Since that time, the Egyptian military has embarked on creating a security zone at Egypt’s border with Gaza. The planned buffer zone was initially planned to be within 500 meters from the border, but was later doubled to 1,000 meters. The width of this buffer zone expanded after additional discoveries of longer tunnels across the border. In mid February, Egyptian security forces claimed it discovered the longest smuggling tunnel to Gaza yet, at 2.5 kilometers in length. Last Friday, a senior Egyptian officer was killed when one of those tunnels collapsed.

 Closing smuggling tunnels is also coupled with very limited opening times for the official border point between Gaza and Sinai, which further limits the flow of goods and passengers. This is worsening the already dire economic situation along the impoverished strip and fueling tensions.

 As Benedetta Berti and Zack Gold have written, Hamas nears the breaking point. This poses a tough question for both Hamas and Egypt, what’s next? In a Reuters report last January, Yasmine Saleh wrote how intelligence operatives, with help from Hamas’s political rivals and activists, plan to undermine the credibility of Hamas in Gaza and initiate protests against the group. An anonymous senior Egyptian security official was quoted in the Reuters report as saying, “We cannot be liberated from the terrorism of the Brotherhood in Egypt without ending it in Gaza, which lies on our borders.”

 Historically, ending Hamas’s role in Gaza has proven to be tricky. Looking forward, there are three possible options: Gazans turn against Hamas, Abbas take-over control of the strip, and/or protests and divisions increases among Hamas cadres. Thus far, none of these scenarios have yet materialized.

 Some have held out hope for the idea of a Gaza “spring” similar to the “Arab spring,” but this is absurd for many reasons. First, Hamas still has support inside Gaza. After all, the group has its social network spread throughout Gaza. It has indoctrinated its youth in a culture of resistance against Israel and also against any Arab regime that tries to undermine the movement. Second, while it is true that many in Gaza are fed-up with Hamas’s tight grip on the strip, will they risk protesting against heavily armed Hamas security forces? This is unlikely. Therefore, it will be daft for policy makers in Cairo to bank on any future “spring” in Gaza.

 In contrast, the possibility of Abbas regaining control of the Gaza strip, which looked plausible after last August’s truce agreement between Hamas and Israel, also did not happen. Months have passed and Mr. Abbas did not (or could not) even visit Gaza. There is even an Israeli report suggesting that the Palestinian Authority thwarted an international initiative supported by the United States, Europe, and Jordan to radically change governmental control in Gaza. President Abbas may want to rule Gaza, but he may fear even more serious percussions in the West Bank, where Hamas still has many supporters.

 The possibility of divisions within Hamas as mentioned in Berti and Gold’s piece is plausible, but any divisions will be irrelevant as long as Hamas’s military wing is intact. It has become increasingly clear during last year’s confrontation with Israel that the armed wing, not the diaspora leadership, has the upper hand in decision making. This will likely to continue in the future. It is hard to imagine how a group with thousands of armed men, who believe that defiance is the key to survival, will voluntary accept any dismantling of their own power and control. Hamas’s military wing has already released a video asking “Why O, Arab?” They clearly feel angry and betrayed by Egypt.

 Meanwhile, Egypt el-Sisi ’s visit to Saudi Arabia, which coincides with the Turkish president Erdogan’s visit, has raised speculations about possible Saudi mediation going between the two sides. It is well known that Turkey is the current main supporter of Hamas. Therefore, in theory, any improvement in the already tense relationship between the two countries can help the besieged Hamas in Gaza. Nonetheless, in reality, any rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt is highly unlikely. The gap between the two sides is very wide and difficult to bridge, despite any sincere Saudi efforts. The Turkish president wants to empower Hamas at any price, even at the expense of Egypt’s security concerns.

 Last August, I wrote about the potential of indirect Egypt involvement in Gaza. However, without Abbas in control of Gaza, it seems that the stage of indirect involvement has now passed. As Berti and Gold hinted, the stage is now set for overt confrontation.

 “ We will resist any Egyptian aggression, like we resisted the Israeli occupation,” a Hamas official to Ma’an news agency. For Hamas, regardless of the final Egyptian legal verdict on its status, Egypt is now the new “Israel.” This is a chilling thought that Egypt has to take seriously. The Egyptian army may struggle to deal with rebellious, hostile Hamas in Gaza, just as Israel did. If a functioning Hamas is a security threat to Egypt, a dying Hamas is no less a threat to Egypt.

Posted in Best Read, Egypt, Gaza, Hamas | Tagged , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Egyptian Aak 2015 – Week 9 ( Feb 23 – Mar 1)

Members of the special forces police stand guard in front of the Supreme Constitutional Court in Cairo

(Members of the special forces police stand guard in front of the Supreme Constitutional Court in Cairo, March 1, 2015- via Reuters)

Main Headlines

 Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday

Thursday

 Friday

Saturday 

 Sunday

 Good reports

Good Read

Video

  • Sisi’s full 22 Feb 2015 speech
  • Mohammed Fahmy’s interview with Sky News

Plus:

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt | Tagged , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Egyptian Aak 2015 – Week 8 ( Feb 16 – 22)

lead

(Relatives of Egyptian Coptic men killed in Libya mourn in al-Our village, south of Egypt. (Photo by Asmaa Waguih/Reuters)

Main Headlines

 Monday

Tuesday

Wednesday

Thursday

Friday 

 Saturday

Sunday

 Good Reports

Good Read

Video

Timeline

Plus

Photo Gallery

Finally here are Jayson Casper’s prayers for Egypt

Posted in Diary of Aak, Egypt | Tagged , , , , , , , | 1 Comment